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UNITED STATES INTERVENTIONS: POWER VACUUMS AND THE RISE OF 
EXTREMIST GROUPS 
 
Sarah Nicole Pedigo 
Old Dominion University, 2016 




The purpose of this study is to examine U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and Syria and the rise 
of violent extremist groups such as ISIS. By utilizing the integrated theory of violations of 
international criminal laws and the realpolitik theoretical frame, this qualitative case study 
analysis will explore how the U.S. foreign policy, driven by realpolitik and neo-liberalism in Iraq 
and Syria, resulted in the rise of violent extremist groups such as ISIS. It was concluded that if 
the United States were to remove the Assad regime and dismantle the Alawite ruling class as it 
did with the Hussein regime and the Ba'ath party in Iraq, it would leave Syria with an immediate 
power vacuum that could easily be filled by Sunni backed extremist groups, including ISIS.  
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 In a recent interview with VICE News, President Obama stated that “ISIL (the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant) is a direct outgrowth of Al Qaeda in Iraq that grew out of our 
invasion, which is an example of unintended consequences” (Hussain 2015:1). Before the U.S. 
led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the extremist juggernaut known as the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) was imponderable. In an attempt to retaliate against the invasion, Sunni resistance 
fighters who opposed the occupation of Iraq by western forces formed a coalition known as 
Jam'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (TJ). Led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, TJ declared war on Shias in 
response to their cooperation with western forces that planned attacks in Sunni villages in an 
attempt to root out Al Qaeda. Subsequently, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 
2004 and TJ joined forces with Al Qaeda forming Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Two years later in 
2006, AQI became the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Finally, once they became involved in the 
Syrian civil war, ISI branched into Syria and became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
Since the forming of ISIS in 2006, the group has been responsible for countless atrocities ranging 
from publicized beheadings to meticulously planned mass terror attacks. In the first 8 months of 
2014, at least 9,347 Iraqi civilians have been killed and at least 17,386 wounded (Obeidallah 
2014). Similarly, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (2015:35) concluded that  
The impact of the current conflict and acts of terrorism on civilians remains severe and 
extensive. Since January 2014, acts of violence have killed or wounded tens of thousands 
of civilians and have displaced over 3 million Iraqis. 
 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq prompted the development of anti-occupation coalition groups, which 




 The purpose of this study is to examine U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and Syria and the rise 
of violent extremist groups such as ISIS. Specifically, this research is designed to examine 
whether U.S. foreign policies and interventions create power vacuums that allow for and 
facilitate the rise of terrorist groups vying for power. One central research question will guide 
this study: How has current U.S. foreign policy, driven by neo-liberalism and realpolitik, resulted 
in the rise of extremist groups such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria? Given the U.S. involvement in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and the foreign policy currently being utilized, this study will explore how the 
U.S. foreign policy, driven by realpolitik and neo-liberalism in Iraq and Syria, resulted in the rise 
of violent extremist groups such as ISIS. 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
By examining the relationship between U.S. foreign policy currently being utilized in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent rise of violent extremist groups such as ISIS, this study 
may provide a better understanding as to the reasons why extremist groups develop in the wake 
of western intervention. While much attention has been given to the commission of state crimes 
abroad, there has been no criminological research examining the U.S. involvement in Syria or 
how their policies and interventions create power vacuums that allow for and facilitate the rise of 
terrorist groups vying for power. By examining how U.S. policies and interventions and actions 
create power vacuums that allow for and facilitate the rise of terrorist groups vying for power, 
this study may provide a better understanding of the possible consequences of the United States 
utilizing similar policies and practices in Syria that it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, 
understanding the underlying reasons for the development of extremist groups such as ISIS is not 
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only beneficial for U.S. policy making in Syria, but for foreign policy making as a whole. If 
current U.S. foreign policy utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in the rise of extremist 
groups such as ISIS, then a change in policies and practices can be implemented before 
interacting with Syria in order to prevent further development of these groups.  
 The following chapter will provide a brief overview of the empirical studies that have 





















REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The following chapter provides an overview of the literature examining state crime, 
realpolitik, and the U.S. led war in Iraq. First, the emergence of state crime and the standards 
used to constitute actions as being criminal are discussed. This is followed by the role of 
international financial institutions in the complicity of state crime. Next, the role of realpolitik in 
the decision making process within the international arena is examined. Finally, state crime and 
realpolitik are culminated into an analysis of U.S. actions in Iraq and Syria that led to the 
development of ISIS.   
 
STATE CRIME 
Defining State Crime  
 Historically, and even in the contemporary timeframe, criminological research has 
focused on individual acts of criminality which tend to take the form of street crimes. However, 
just recently there has been a push to extend this traditional viewpoint beyond the act of mere 
individuals and into the realm of state actors (Kramer 1992; Kauzlarich and Kramer 1993; 
Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998; Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000; Michalowski and Kramer 2006; 
Mullins and Rothe 2008; Whyte 2012; Friedrichs and Rothe 2014). The origins of state crime 
can be traced back to Edwin Sutherland (1940) who was the first criminologist to call attention to 
crimes committed in the context of legitimate occupations and corporations, which he labeled as 
"White-Collar Crime.” Even though Sutherland brought attention to these primordial forms of 
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state crime, it was not until William Chambliss' (1989) American Society of Criminology 
Presidential address that more systematic attention was given to the concept of state crime. These 
early works pertaining to state crime were plagued by definitional issues including, "whether the 
individual or the state (organization) was culpable for acts deemed a state crime," and, "what 
standards should be used to define state criminality" (Rothe 2009b:2). In response to this 
question, Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) asserted that not only could organizations be a primary 
focus of analysis in state and corporate crime, they should be. Further, their research highlighted 
the fact that the center of state criminality is not the individual, but rather the state. With this 
being said, punishing the individual would do nothing to deter the state from further offending. 
Not only do recognizing states and organizations as having the ability to commit crime make it 
possible to levy appropriate controls on rogue organizations, it also makes it possible for victims 
to be justly compensated. In regards to the later concern, some scholars, in particular Sharkansky 
(1995), have argued that if states do not violate the laws that they have created for themselves, 
then their actions cannot be labeled as criminal and any attempt to intervene is a direct violation 
of that state's national sovereignty. Their actions may be seen as being deviant, however they 
cannot be inherently criminal. There is also the issue of operationalizing the definition of state 
criminality. More simply stated, scholars have grappled with the question of should state 
criminality be limited to the individual state as Sharkansky (1995) argued, or should it breech the 
boundaries of the international arena? Green and Ward (2000) suggest that state criminality 
should be a combination of human rights violations and state organizational deviance. Rothe and 
Friedrichs (2006) concluded that the majority of criminologists agree that the use of international 
law provides a framework for defining and understanding state crime. This basic framework 
includes human rights and social and economic harms, but more importantly, it provides a 
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legalistic foundation from which to build upon. The use of international law as a framework 
creates a streamlined understanding of state crime and it also resolves any ongoing issues 
regarding holding the state, versus the individual criminally liable as actors. Taking this into 
consideration, Rothe (2009b:6) defined state crime as  
Any action that violates international public law, and/or a state's own domestic law when 
these actions are committed by individual actors acting on behalf of, or in the name  of 
the state, even when such acts are motivated by their personal economical, political, and 
ideological interests. 
 
 After establishing that international law provides the most complete framework for 
defining state crime, standards had to be conceptualized in order to classify acts as being 
criminal. As a guide, there have been two agreed upon standards that are used to classify state 
actions as being criminal. These include using the legalistic approach and the social harm 
approach. The legalistic approach combines international laws including various customary laws, 
treaties, and charters, as well as a state’s own domestic laws. Because this approach includes the 
broader umbrella of international law, it provides a more streamlined understanding of state 
criminality. It also encompasses laws regarding human rights as well as social and economic 
harms. By doing so, it eliminates the problem of holding the individual versus the state 
accountable since it is not limited to one or the other. However, Rothe and Kauzlarich (2014:7) 
have criticized this approach for using “law as a tool of the state to control the very entities that 
create it.” This argument rests on the fact that states create their own domestic laws. Inherently, 
these laws are created by those in positions of power within the state. Therefore, these laws are 
made to fulfill the interests of those in power, rather than to actually be mechanisms to define 
harmful behavior as being criminal. On the contrary, these laws have the potential to normalize 
criminal behavior as being necessary. On the other side of the spectrum is the social harm 
approach which realizes that the definition of crime is subjectively constructed based on issues of 
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power, including both political and economic factors. Many actions that are inherently criminal 
are omitted from domestic law due to the fact that they are of interest to those in positions of 
power. The social harm approach recognizes this phenomenon and expands the spectrum of 
victimization by including those who have been affected both directly and indirectly by the 
harmful actions of the state. The social harm approach is also amendable of omission and 
critiquing the harms facilitated by states: in the case at hand, the interventions that may have led 
to the rise of terrorist organizations vying for power.  
 
The Western Hegemony  
While there are multiple issues of complexity when explaining and defining state 
criminality, there has also been a general tendency of viewing the entire international arena 
within a capitalistic, United States centered viewpoint. Moreover, instead of taking into account 
all of the vital social, economic, and political structures that make up the international arena, 
those who study state criminality tend to focus solely on capitalistic viewpoints, thus boiling the 
entirety of the international arena into an unrealistically simple entity. This phenomenon can be 
seen in Kaulzarich and Kramer’s (1998) theoretical framework in which the researchers 
integrated multiple criminological theories in an attempt to explain state crime. However, they 
failed to encompass the international nature of state criminality and instead narrowly focused on 
westernized capitalistic viewpoints. By doing so, many accounts and rationalizations of state 
criminality become inherently biased and are therefore uncharacteristic of many of the state 
actors involved in the entirety of the international arena. These dominant countries are frequently 
referred to as the global north. Rothe and Friedrichs (2015:6) note that countries of the global 
north are also referred to as "rich countries, industrialized countries...or the developed countries.” 
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On the contrary, developing countries constitute the global south. The dominancy of countries in 
the global north is apparent in virtually every aspect of global society, including the economic, 
political, and cultural aspects of the world. This phenomenon is frequently referred to as the 
western hegemonic control. Rothe and Friedrichs (2015:7) operationalized the term to refer to 
"the dominance of the developed countries of the west (or global north) not only economically 
but politically and culturally.” Notoriously headed by the United States, the countries of the 
global north are driven by neo-liberal, free market fundamentalism. It is their belief that 
economic policy throughout the world should “privilege free markets and private sector 
enterprise – or a purely capitalistic economic system—over one with substantial government or 
public sector controls” (2015:7). This privatization fosters power accumulation and the 
continuation of criminal activity, all of which is masked within the democratic system. The free 
market model that arises from this system is enormously skewed to favor countries of the global 
north, western corporations, as well as financial institutions that are notoriously influenced by 
the elite western countries from which they do business. States themselves are interested in 
growing their economy in order to maintain their political legitimacy as well as their military and 
economic power. As a result, corporations become a primary concern. Also critical to the growth 
of corporations are financial institutions. Subsequently, states cater to the wants and needs of 
these institutions in order to expand their own power and legitimacy.  
 
State-Corporate Crime 
 As previously mentioned, states are naturally inclined to be interested in the growth of 
their own economy in order to maintain their legitimacy in the world market, as well as their 
political and military power. In order to incur as much profit as possible, states must place 
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corporations at the forefront of their concern and be attentive to their demands. Financial 
institutions are also critical to corporate growth and expansion. Due to the mutuality of the 
system, states are intertwined with, impact, and are impacted by financial institutions. This 
further exacerbates the difficulty in separating and assigning appropriate blame when crimes are 
committed. To further complicate the matter, this intricate system is masked within the liberal 
democratic system which, by nature emphasizes the deregulation of corporations, privatization, 
as well as an open market system (Rothe 2009b). This system revolves around the idea that 
"economic policy should privilege free markets and private sector enterprise--or a purely 
capitalistic economic system--over one with substantial government or public sector controls and 
engagement" (Rothe and Friedrichs 2015:7). Within the system issues of substantial meaning are 
stripped of their importance and used as a means to pacify and redirect the attention of those who 
suffer, making it possible for state and state-corporate crimes to continue virtually unchecked.  Si
 Since the introduction of state-corporate crime in the criminological field, there has been 
an emergence of studies related to the subject (Bruce and Becker 2007; Mullins and Rothe 2008; 
Whyte 2012; Friedrichs and Rothe 2014; Whyte 2014).This blending of the state and corporate 
actors is most widely recognized by Kramer and Michalowski's (1990:4) definition of state-
corporate crime:  
State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that occur when one or 
more institutions or political governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation with one or 
more institutions of economic production and distribution. 
 
State-corporate crime can be further separated into two distinct categories: state-facilitated crime 
and state-initiated crime (Kramer 1992; Kauzlarich and Kramer 1993). State-initiated corporate 
crime "occurs when corporations, employed by the government, engage in organizational 
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deviance at the direction of, or with the tacit approval of, the government." Sate-facilitated 
corporate crime occurs when  
Government regulatory institutions fail to restrain deviant activities either because of 
direct collusion between business and government or because they adhere to shared goals 
whose attainment would be hampered by aggressive regulation. (Kramer, Michalowski, 
and Kauzlarich 2002:271-2). 
 
Mullins and Rothe (2008) examined state-initiated crime in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). The researchers used the framework of international law to provide a qualitative 
case study on international state-corporate crimes committed in the DRC that drew upon primary 
documentation from national government organizations (NGOs) and quasi-governmental 
organizations focusing heavily on reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. 
United Nations reports and media accounts were also used. It was found that the DRC's problems 
could be attributed more to the behavior of mineral hungry transnational corporations and 
regional neighbors, rather than to the colonial-post colonial transition that many had assumed. 
Due to the push from foreign markets to get the valuable minerals into the Western market, 
transnational corporations disregarded the blatant human rights violations and civil war atrocities 
of genocidal character. They concluded that "while the legacy of colonialism and post-
colonialism chaos has weakened essentially every social institution within the society, it is the 
engine of transnational hyper-capitalism that drove the bulk of the crime discussed here" 
(2008:97). One the other hand, Bruce and Becker (2007) examined state-facilitated crime in their 
study about state-corporate crime and the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. They aimed to 
demonstrate how the state’s role in state-corporate crime can evolve from the role of an 
instigator to that of a facilitator. They used Kauzlarich and Kramer's (1998) integrated theory of 
crime as a framework to analyze the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Paducah, Kentucky. 
This qualitative instrumental case study examined the in the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant to 
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provide insight into an issue or to infer a generalization. Bruce and Becker (2007:38) found that 
the U.S. government made the decision to locate a nuclear plant at the Paducah site and 
“subsequently encouraged a generally lax attitude towards safety, and harmed plant workers by 
deliberately exposing them to materials known to be harmful.” The plant was also transferred 
from government ownership to private ownership even after its aforementioned history of 
neglect and failure to enforce safety regulations. This transaction subsequently changed the 
state's role from that of an instigator to that of a facilitator.  They concluded that due to the fact 
that government institutions did nothing to restrain such problems that subsequently lead to 
environmental and physical health harms, the state had in fact engaged in crime. 
 As previously mentioned, international financial institutions are critical to corporate 
growth and expansion and since states place corporate growth at the forefront of their concern, 
international financial institutions play a major role in state activity. Therefore, researchers have 
found it necessary to mention their role in the state-corporate crime conglomerate. Rothe and 
Friedrichs (2015) outlined the goals of international financial institutions as being the promotion 
of development and growth in the global south. However, often times the interests of wealthy 
lender countries, corporations, and elite political officials of the countries in question are 
honored rather than those of the citizens in desperate need (2015). This aid is typically rendered 
by international financial institutions in the form of structural adjustment programs. These 
programs are put in place by the financier to ensure that they receive a return on their investment 
from the borrowing countries. The policies contained in these programs are superimposed upon, 
and detrimental to, the citizens of the global south. International financial institutions are 
ultimately shaped and influenced by institutions and elite entities that are located in the global 
north. In order to further their own geopolitical interests as well as those of the wealthy elites in 
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the global north, international financial institutions have adopted the private sector development 
strategy which requires countries who receive financial aid to adopt policies that “foster 
democracy,” meaning it opens the doors for privatization and private ownership. Rothe and 
Friedrichs (2015:33) noted that “in return for debt reallocations or admission into forgiveness 
programs, it demanded that macro-structural political and economic changes occur within the 
debtor nations.” This arrangement created by the neo-liberal democratic system in turn, promotes 
system criminality which facilitates criminal activity that expands beyond a singular actor, and 
emanates throughout states, organizations, and networks. This phenomenon is highlighted in 
Rothe and Collins’ (2011) study on arms trafficking.  
State crimes are linked to corporations as well as international financial institutions. 
Corporate crimes are undoubtedly linked to the state as well as international financial 
institutions. Each of these combinations cumulates into crimes of the powerful. Not only is it 
hard to assign appropriate blame, it is also difficult to put an end to the cycle of crime. 
Chambliss, Michalowski, and Kramer (2010) conclude that the traditional way of dealing with 
these types of crimes is to focus on individual actors, organizations, or states. Since this way of 
committing crime promotes compartmentalization, eliminating one cog will not shut down the 
whole machine. Rather, the missing cog will be replaced and the machine will carry on. 
Chambliss et al. (2010:220) point out that this type of individualism “shifts the attention away 
from international networks of power that nurtures inequalities and state crime.” Thus, the 
individualistic approach that is used today pacifies the situation and allows for state and state-
corporate crime to continue virtually unchecked. Additionally, as the literature notes, the 
individualistic approach negates any analysis of the role the broader structure plays in crime 
commission including states’ interests, what is often referred to as realpolitik. 
13 
 
Rothe and Friedrichs (2015:76) define realpolitik as, "a political ideology that prioritizes 
the economic, military, and political interests of states above moral and ethical obligations.” As 
previously mentioned, states put the interests of corporations and international financial 
institutions at the forefront of their concern in order to gain power in the form of political, 
military, and economic capital. This practice makes it possible for moral obligations to be 
forgone in the hopes of advancing ones own political, military, or economic agenda. Recently 
there has been a surge of research regarding the impact of the use of realpolitik within the 
international arena (Rothe 2008; Rothe 2009a; Collins and Rothe 2013; Rothe and Steinmetz 
2013).  
In the study of the Reagan administration and Nicaragua, Rothe (2008) aimed to add to 
the literature, provide a descriptive account of the events that transpired during the Reagan 
administration's war with Nicaragua, and to analyze the causal factors behind the criminality of 
the United States. This qualitative singular case study drew primarily upon governmental 
documents on the Reagan administration's war with Nicaragua. The researcher analyzed the case 
using the framework of the integrated theory of violations of international criminal law. Rothe 
(2008:65) found that "the acts of aggression and illegalities committed by the Reagan 
administration were the result of an ideological doctrine based on imperialism: economic, 
military, and political superiority.” Due to this, the country and its citizens were forced to endure 
years of violence and acts of terrorism at the hands of the government. It was abundantly clear 
that the United States was motivated by the furtherance of its own domestic corporate interests 
and that Nicaragua clashed with these long term interests. The study also pointed out the fact that 
elite countries rarely allow themselves to be regulated by outside agencies, and in the event that 
they do, they usually either sit, or have allies that sit on the Security Council. As a result, these 
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elite countries can capitalize by using veto power in order to further their own political and 
economic interests. Subsequently, state sovereignty is limited by the impunity of elite countries. 
This issue of impunity is also discussed in Rothe's (2009a) critical analysis of post-resistance to 
state criminality, realpolitik, and ideology. It pushes to end impunity for heads of state and high 
ranking officials and highlights the need for a change in the characteristics of the international 
arena, which is deeply embedded in using realpolitik when applying international criminal law. 
The researcher used the framework of realpolitik as a guide to analyze the use of impunity in the 
international arena. It was concluded that the role of realpolitik in international relations “makes 
it nearly impossible to implement policies aimed at reducing its impact on international criminal 
justice due to the disjuncture between what "ought" to be and what "is" (2009a:116). As 
previously discussed, economic, military, and political interests are the primary concern of states 
rather than moral and ethical obligations to the wellbeing of the international arena and all of its 
actors. Furthermore, impunity makes it possible for elite actors to commit crimes against 
humanity in order to further their own agendas without any fear of repercussions levied by the 
international arena, who themselves are unwilling to intervene if such acts could jeopardize their 
own self-interests. Overall, Rothe (2009a) asserted that realpolitik must be addressed before 
there can be an end to impunity. States must relegate economic, military, and political interests in 
favor of a fully shared consciousness of common moral obligations based on a social contract 
that proposes accountability for all.  
To further add to the literature on realpolitik, Rothe's (2010) qualitative case study 
analyzed the global principle of ending impunity, realpolitik, and legal precedent. By examining 
the case of the former president of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, whose international arrest warrant 
was issued by Spain, the researcher aimed to demonstrate that we have not yet achieved a world 
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where ending impunity is universally recognized nor indicated as a universally shared value by 
all states. The data was collected via primary government documents as well as documents from 
various international agencies such as the International Court of Justice and was analyzed using 
the framework of jurisprudence and realpolitik. It was found that there has been a difference 
between the “stated support for an ideology and the realpolitik involved in the implementation of 
mechanisms for ending impunity” (2010:408). Therefore, the ideological support for abandoning 
realpolitik in favor of ending immunity is present. However, the reality is that states lack the 
political will to uphold these ideologies for fear of political and economic consequences for 
delineating from the international norm. Thus, the cycle of crime continues, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and genocide occur, states do not prosecute for fear of their own self-
interests, those in charge are not reprimanded, and the crime continues. As with other studies 
dealing with realpolitik, policy implications are nothing more than a call for unity within the 
international arena to present a unified front against the continued use of realpolitik and 
impunity. In their study on foreign intervention and realpolitik in Egypt's Arab Spring, Collins 
and Rothe (2013) aimed to examine and unveil the contradictions between the United States' 
support of the uprising in Egypt that led to the subsequent removal of President Mubarak from 
office and its backing of repressive regimes. This qualitative discourse analysis used a case study 
approach utilizing both primary and secondary documents to understand the relations of power 
between Egypt and the United States. These included official government reports such as 
presidential addresses, White House press statements, United Nations reports, as well as media 
statements. The researchers used realpolitik as a theoretical framework to analyze the case, being 
the Arab spring uprising in Egypt and subsequent removal of Mubarak from office. Overall, 
Collins and Rothe (2013:18) found that regardless of state officials condemning the atrocities 
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committed by the Mubarak regime at the time of the Arab Spring uprising, “geopolitical interests 
dominated the United States' policy response and actions.” The only favorable discourse about 
the removal of Mubarak was in an attempt to pacify the masses and provide a legitimization by 
asserting that the United States stands by global social justice. Collins and Rothe (2013:20) 
concluded that  
In exposing the two faces of the United States in its support for the people's movement 
and its simultaneous economic, political, and military support for the Egyptian 
government, this research has revealed the hypocrisy of US foreign policy in Egypt and 
the lager political goals that guide it. 
 
The United States placed their geopolitical and economic interests above that of those who were 
being repressed by the Mubarak regime. Any attempt to provide favorable rhetoric in regards to 
the removal of Mubarak was merely an attempt to thwart criticism and to legitimize the 
administration.  
 More closely related to the study at hand, there has been a significant amount of research 
on the United States war on Iraq. In a study on the Legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Schmitt 
(2004) analyzed the legal justifications for Operation Iraqi Freedom. By international law as 
theoretical framework, Schmitt (2004) provided a qualitative case study and analysis of the U.S. 
led Operation Iraqi Freedom. International law requires that any attack under the guise of self-
defense must be proportional as well as necessary to an armed attack that is either proven to be 
imminent or is already underway. It was found that 
Iraq was not about to launch an attack in the United States, with weapons of mass 
destruction or otherwise, in the immediate future. Nor is there any compelling evidence 
of Iraq distributing WMD to transnational terrorists or any other way directing or 
sponsoring specific and imminent attacks on the United States (2004:91). 
 
 Similarly, Kramer and Michalowski (2005) used the integrated theory of crime as a 
framework to provide a qualitative case study and criminological analysis of the U.S. led war in 
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Iraq. They too found an absence of a clearly defined imminent threat of attack by Iraq where it 
was stated that, "Iraq, however, had not attacked the United States nor was there any claim that 
such an attack was imminent" (2005:448). Not only did they find that there was no imminent 
threat of attack, they also concluded that the U.S. government was able to legitimize the war on 
Iraq by linking Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq to the wider War on Terrorism. By doing 
so, Kramer and Michalowski (2005:460) concluded that the U.S. government was able to 
"establish the idea that security required the ability to attack any nation believed to be supporting 
terror, no matter how weak the evidence.” By linking the Hussein regime to the War on Terror, 
the United States government was able to legitimize the attack, even in the absence of any 
imminent threat of danger, including WMD. Further, it was found that in regards to WMD, "even 
if Iraq had possessed the weapons that the United States claimed, in the absence of clear steps to 
use them against the United States…there would have been no justification under Article 51 for 
Attacking Iraq" (2005:60). Not only was it found that there were no WMD as the U.S. 
government claimed, there was also no evidence of clear steps being taken by Iraq to use them 
against the United States. It was concluded that "the mere possession of weapons, even in the 
hands of an enemy nation, does not constitute the treat of an attack" (2005:60). In a study on law 
and the use of force, Roberts (2003) used the framework of previously established international 
law to provide a qualitative case study and critical analysis of the effectiveness of the United 
Nations Security Council on the Iraq War. It was found that since this action did not have the 
explicit authorization of the United Nations Security Council, “it could easily be viewed as 
having at best a doubtful basis in international law" (2003:39). Kramer, Michalowski, and Rothe 
(2005:53) found similar results in their aforementioned study asserting that the war on Iraq poses 
a threat to the United Nations Charter system in that "the United Nations Security Council did 
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not authorize an invasion of Iraq either to enforce Security Council resolutions or to achieve 
humanitarian goals" and if the two qualifications for legal use of force under international law 
are the threat of imminent attack and United National Security Council authorization, the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq constitutes war crimes. Also in Kramer and Michalowski's (2005:449) 
previously mentioned study, it was found that “even if Hussein had possessed WMD, absent of 
explicit authorization from the United Nations Security Council the invasion would still have 
been a violation of international law.” Simply put, even if Saddam Hussein has possessed WMD 
as the previously established arguments asserted that he did, without the explicit consent of the 
United National Security Council, the invasion of Iraq is, and would still be, illegal. In order to 
combat the lack of authorization from the United Nations Security Council, the United States and 
its allies sought to declare Iraq to be in violation of Resolution 1441, which was a disarmament 
resolution as well as Resolution 678, which set out the terms for the cease fire pending the end of 
first Gulf War, effectively authorizing force to remove Iraq from Kuwait. They further claimed 
that Iraq did not comply with the Resolutions and were therefore a threat to international peace 
and security (Kramer et al. 2005). Despite these efforts, it was found that "even if Iraq had been 
in clear violation of Resolution 1441, the Security Council would have had to determine if the 
violation was of sufficient magnitude to authorize military force” (2005:62). Accordingly, 
without this authorization, the invasion of Iraq was a direct violation of international law. 
Therefore, the claims of Iraq being in violation of Resolutions 1441 and 678 were voided and the 
subsequent invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies was illegal on all counts. In a study 
of terrorizing violence and the Iraq war, Bonds (2014) analyzed the terrorizing violence used by 
the United States as well as the need for humanitarian norms within a cost-benefit analysis when 
considering the deployment of violence. By using the framework of previously established 
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global humanitarian norms the researcher provided a qualitative case study and critical analysis 
of the "Long Iraq war" ranging from the sanctions regime in 1990-2002 to the U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy used after the 2003 invasion (2014:365). It was found that political 
gains were valued ahead of moral obligations to the citizens of post invasion Iraq. Bonds 
(2014:380) found that "in the case of the Long Iraq War, U.S. war makers enacted policies that 
ultimately targeted citizens in an attempt to communicate a larger political message.”  
Continuing with geopolitical interests, the regime change and overthrow of Saddam Hussein is 
another key factor in legal question regarding the U.S. war in Iraq.  
Schmitt (2004:102) found that "the Administration desperately desired regime change in 
Iraq.” However, regime change can only legally be accomplished if it is a legitimate 
consequence of otherwise legal use of force. Which, as previously discussed, the war in Iraq was 
an illegal war of aggression, thus making the action an illegal use of force. Schmitt (2004:102) 
concluded that “states may not, absent Security Council mandate, act for the sole purpose of 
removing a regime of which they disapprove; doing so would constitute a patent violation of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.” These political motives are also seen in Kramer, Michalowski, 
and Rothe's (2005) previously mentioned study where the humanitarian motives were questioned 
and ultimately found to be a mask for the underlying geopolitical interests of the United States. It 
was found that  
The use of indiscriminant weapons such as cluster bombs, napalm, and depleted uranium 
shells by the invading forces, however, suggests that the primary goal was not to protect 
Iraqi civilians, but to destroy the Iraqi army and topple the regime of a troublesome 
adversary (2005:65).  
 
In a study about wars of choice, Doig (2014) preformed a case study analysis on 
numerous interventions using the framework of international law in order to analyze why a 
liberal democratic state may pursue an approach that boarders a state crime. It was found that  
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The potential for state crime rests through wars of choice...that go beyond the authorized 
basis for the original intervention, or intervention on grounds of benefit to the wider 
international community that masks the self-interest of particular geo-political 
perspectives and alliances (2014:44-5).  
 
Doig's (2014) research coincides with the notion that the reasoning behind the use of 
humanitarian intervention as an explanation for the invasion of Iraq was an attempt to cover up 
the hidden geo-political agendas of the invading nations. Bellamy (2006) identified an acceptable 
criterion for the use of humanitarian intervention. Four acceptable reasons for the use of 
humanitarian intervention were identified, they include: right intention, which is defined as being 
for the common good. A just cause which is considered to be an acceptable act of self-defense or 
defense against those who disturb the peace. Proportionality of ends which is defined as 
"whether the overall harm likely to be caused by the war is less than that caused by the wrong 
that is being righted." Finally, last resort which occurs if and only if the use of force is seen as 
being the only way to stop the wrongdoing that is being done (2006:38). The United States and 
the United Kingdom claimed a just cause for their invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. In 
their aforementioned study, Kramer and Michalowski (2005:450) found that the United States 
and the United Kingdom argued that they “had a right and a duty to the use of military force for 
the humanitarian purpose of saving Iraqis from human rights violations by the Hussein 
government.” However, it is important to note that this claim was only asserted after Iraq had 
already been invaded and the claim of the Hussein government possessing weapons of mass 
destruction had been debunked. Therefore, the claims of humanitarian concerns were merely an 
attempt to save face once the original arguments had been disproven. Similarly, Schmitt 
(2004:101) concluded that "while the regime's treatment of the Iraqi population was morally and 
legally reprehensible...it did not justify humanitarian intervention absent Security Council de jure 
or de facto acquiescence.”  
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Subsequent occupation of Iraq also violated International Humanitarian Law (IHL), or 
the law of armed conflict. Even though the invasion of Iraq was not authorized as being 
legitimate by the United Nations Security Council, it was recognized that Iraq was in fact 
occupied by the United States and its allies. In response to this, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 1483 which officially recognized the United States and the United 
Kingdom as the occupying powers in Iraq. Kramer and Michalowski (2005:452) noted that "this 
resolution required the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to comply fully with their 
obligations under international law, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague 
Regulations of 1907.” These international laws aim to "protect civilians and noncombatants, 
limit the means or methods that are permissible during warfare, and set out the rules that govern 
the behaviors of occupying forces" (Kramer, Michalowski, and Rothe 2005:66). In regards to the 
subsequent occupation of Iraq, Kramer et al. (2005:67) found that the Bush and Blair 
administrations committed the following violations of International Humanitarian Law, "failure 
to secure public safety and protect civilian rights, illegal transformation of the Iraqi economy, 
indiscriminate responses to the Iraqi resistance, and torture and abuse of Iraqi prisoners.” As 
previously discussed, the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention rests on the protection of the 
civilian population and the United States' use of indiscriminant weapons completely disregarded 
the lives of noncombatant civilians, thus constituting a breach of International Humanitarian 
Laws. Likewise, the aforementioned restructuring of the Iraqi economy to benefit western-
corporations and give the United States unrestricted access to Iraqi oil exports also constitutes a 
breach. There has also been research on the illegality of the use of torture and abuse against Iraqi 
prisoners by the United States (Hamm 2007; Heurich and Vaughn 2009; Rothe, Kramer, and 
Mullins 2009; Smeulers and Niekerk 2009; deHaven-Smith 2010; Serralvo 2012; Hagan 2015). 
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Notably, deHaven-Smith (2010:413-6) found that the evidence indicates Bush and Cheney 
“formulated doctrines to justify torture and military preemption and authorized the torture of 
prisoners to obtain bogus confessions linking Iraq to Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden to 9/11.”  
In a study on neo-liberal rule in Iraq, Whyte (2007) used the framework of neo-liberalism 
and international law to analyze the actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 
occupied Iraq. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations asserts that the occupying force should do 
everything within its power to ensure public safety and restore public order while also respecting 
the domestic laws of the country, unless in dire circumstance. Likewise, Article 64 of the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 states that the occupying power can only subject the occupied state to 
changes which are absolutely essential for the occupying power to fulfill its obligations of 
maintaining peace, security, and order. Greider (2003:5) furthers this argument by stating that the 
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 “specifically prohibits conquering powers from restructuring 
the economy of a conquered nation in accordance with the ideology and economics of the 
conqueror.”  
With this being established, Whyte (2007) found that the neo-liberal rules that the CPA 
laid down for Iraq including the abolition of commodity protection and the abolition of seed 
sharing, both of which were common economic practices before the invasion, were not essential 
in maintaining orderly government or national security. Therefore, "the CPA rules can be 
regarded as falling beyond the legal limits of the powers of an occupation government laid down 
by the Geneva Convention" (2007:182). Further, Whyte (2010:138) concluded that  
The legally binding administrative orders issued by the CPA created a trade regime that 
eradicated protections for local industry...and generally created a WTO-compliant regime 




This irradiation of protection for Iraqi businesses forced the economy into a revolving door of 
lending and borrowing, further plunging it into an innumerable depression. Herring and Ragwala 
(2006:252-7) concluded that "enforced debt dependency shackled the Iraqi economy to the 
economic prescriptions of international donors and lenders.” This further ensured that the neo-
liberal reforms introduced by the occupiers would remain entrenched in the Iraqi system long 
after the Coalition Provisional Authority departs. However, regardless of international law, the 
economic transformation of Iraq into a western suited financial ally was exponentially appealing 
to the elite leaders of countries in the global north, in particular, the United States.  
 In his January 23, 1980 State of the Union Address, Jimmy Carter (1980:4) proclaimed 
 An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be 
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.  
 
As evidenced by this statement, the Middle East is of crucial importance to the United States in 
that it provides vital goods in the form of oil. Crude oil is essentially the backbone of the Unites 
States and ever since its discovery it has played a decisive role in nearly all foreign conflicts that 
the United States has been a part of, including Iraq. Whyte (2007) recognized this appeal and 
found that the economic transformation of the Iraqi economy was possibly only because the U.S. 
occupation was willing to ignore international law in order to create an economy that was more 
suited towards the World Trade Organization. By doing so, the United States could profit off of 
Iraq's main economic asset, oil. Further, this neo-liberal economic regime that was imposed upon 
the Iraqi economy by the United States "facilitated the transfer of Iraqi oil revenue into the hands 
of Western corporations with no mandate from the Iraqi people” (2007:191). In an introspective 
analysis of the U.S. invasion of Iraq using the framework of Iraq being a war of aggression, Adu-
Pimpim Boaduo (2012) came up with similar findings that the United States and the United 
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Kingdom knew that Iraq did not posses WMD. Rather, they "only wanted to secure access and 
control of the world's second largest oil reserves which would aid them in ascertaining their geo-
political position in the oil producing region" (2012:94). Overall,  Whyte (2007) and Adu-
Pimpim Boaduo (2012) have concluded that the given reasons for the invasion in Iraq (self-
defense, counter-terrorism, the spread of democracy) were a front in order to disguise the true 
hidden agenda of the conquering powers, to create an economic structure that would benefit 
western corporations and provide unlimited access to Iraq's lucrative oil reserves. Kramer, 
Michalowski, and Rothe (2005:70) concluded that "the occupying powers knew their actions 
violated international law; they simply did not feel obligated to comply.” As a whole, state crime 
in the case of Iraq must be viewed as a part of a wider strategy of both political and economic 
domination in order for the attainment of geo-political goals or realpolitik (Whyte 2007). 
Additionally, in a study of the cost of economic conflict crimes in post-invasion 
Baghdad, Hagan, Rothenberg, Hanson, and Parker (2012) crossed referenced the 2003 Gallup 
Poll (GP) of Baghdad and the 2003-8 Iraq History Project Current Vio lations Initiative (CVI) 
interview studies in order to present an estimate of civilian losses from economic conflict crimes 
that followed the U.S. led invasion of Iraq. It was found that “the largest and most statistically 
significant of the losses are associated with crimes that can involve large ransoms”, namely 
beheadings and kidnappings. Also significant are losses associated with businesses. It was 
concluded that there was notable evidence of “the widespread, systematic nature of economic 
conflict crimes during the Iraq conflict” and the total estimated economic losses for the entire 
country were found to be “approximately US$329 billion” (2012:494-5). Further, Green and 
Ward (2009) examined post-invasion Iraq in order to highlight the impact of the violence and 
corruption of the invasion and occupation on the dynamics of violence within its post-invasion 
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society. It was found that as a response to, and consequence of, the violent overthrow of the 
Hussein regime, political and criminal violence merged and created a new spectrum of violence 
as a means to a political end. This change in the landscape of violence was found to facilitate the 
rise of “dual purpose criminality: acts of murder, rape, kidnapping, smuggling, and robbery that 
simultaneously accommodate individual and organizational goals” (Green and Ward 2009:13). 
Likewise, using Tilly's framework of state-building often being a product of organized criminal 
activity as well as Cloward and Ohlin's assertion that organized criminals infiltrate state 
organizations and join legitimate and illegitimate means in order to facilitate a criminal 
enterprise that is protected by the state, Hagan, Kaiser, Hanson, and Parker (2015) crossed 
examined the 2003 Gallup Poll (GP) of Baghdad and the 2003-8 Iraq History Project Current 
Violations Initiative (CVI) interview studies in order to show how the self-fulfilling forces that 
followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq were motivated by fear and uncertainty. It was noted that the 
Mahidi Army used targeted harassment and threats against Sunni victims in Baghdad which 
amplified the self-fulfilling prophecy of fear that was further provoked by the U.S invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. The researchers concluded that “Iraqis in vulnerable neighborhoods were 
already fearfully anticipating the dangerous consequences of sectarian violence that this 
American invasion would unleash." This piece implicitly speaks to the power vacuum created by 
U.S. policies in Iraq in that is specifically highlights the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation 
of Iraq leading to additional crimes, from street crimes to trafficking. Hussain (2015:1) affirms 
these findings by asserting that “under Iraq’s new democratic regime which was armed by the 
U.S. and backed by Iran the Sunnis of the north became increasingly aggrieved, and this 
provided the perfect opportunity for ISI (Islamic State of Iraq, a precursor to ISIS) to fill the 
power vacuum.”  
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While much attention has been given to the commission of state crimes abroad, there has 
been no criminological research examining the U.S. involvement in Syria or how their policies 
and interventions create power vacuums that allow for and facilitate the rise of terrorist groups 
vying for power. Additionally, while Hagan et al. (2015) implies the role a power vacuum can 
have after U.S. involvement, overtly and covertly, no research has focused on the rise of groups 
from the Talaban, to Al Qaeda to ISIS.  Given the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
the foreign policy currently being utilized, this thesis will explore how the U.S. foreign policy, 
driven by realpolitik and neo-liberalism in Iraq and Syria, resulted in the rise of violent extremist 
groups such as ISIS. The following chapter provides a detailed description of the research 




















 This research will utilize a qualitative case study design to conduct a chronological 
temporal analysis. This chapter describes the relevant aspects of qualitative methods and a 
detailed description of the study design utilized, the procedures, and the chronological temporal 
analysis that will employed in this study.  A final section will outline limitations that are 
associated with the use of the qualitative case study research design and those specific to this 
study. 
 
STUDY DESIGN  
 In order to gain an in depth understanding how U.S. foreign policy, driven by realpolitik 
and neo-liberalism in Iraq and Syria resulted in the rise of violent extremist groups such as ISIS, 
the case study design has been chosen. This allows for an in depth analysis of a specific 
phenomenon drawing from one case. The timeframe used for this study fell between the 
initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, to the present day.  As previously 
mentioned, when utilizing the case study approach, the idea of representative sampling is 
rejected in favor of analytical induction and researchers are advised to select a case which 






THE IMPORTANCE OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS  
 While qualitative research methods have been used by a variety of researchers in a vast 
number of fields, quantitative methods are still heavily favored in criminological and 
sociological research. Despite this, qualitative research methods prove to be more beneficial in 
certain cases. Qualitative research "involves any research that uses data that does not indicate 
ordinal values" (Nkwi, Nyamongo, and Ryan 2001:1). Simply put, qualitative research methods 
are any measures where the data is not recorded in numerical form. Starman (2013:30) noted that 
qualitative research is characterized by an interpretative paradigm, which emphasis subjective 
experiences as well as an idiographic approach "which emphasizes an individual's perspective on 
the investigative situation, process, relations, etc." These characteristics of qualitative research 
give the researcher a unique in depth understanding of individual perspectives. Trochmin and 
Donnelly (2008) highlighted four specific circumstances in which qualitative research proves to 
be highly beneficial: for achieving an in depth understanding of the issue at hand, for developing 
detailed accounts to describe a phenomenon, and for mixed methods research. In regards to 
providing detailed accounts in order to describe a specific phenomenon, Trochmin and Donnelly 
(2008:143) noted that "impersonal numbers may not connect their experience. Illustrating the 
implications of quantitative data through well-researched qualitative anecdotes and stories is 
essential to effective use of social research." When attempting to understand a specific 
phenomenon, qualitative research is imperative. Overall, qualitative research excels at "telling 
the story from the participant's viewpoint, providing the rich, descriptive detail that sets 
quantitative results into the human context" (2008:144).  
 One particular qualitative method that is utilized in this study is the case study method. 
Simons (2009:21) defined the case study as an "in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives 
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of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program, or system 
in real life." Likewise, Mesec (1998:45) defined the case study as a "comprehensive description 
of an individual case and its analysis; i.e., the characterization of the case and the events, as well 
as a description of the discovery process of these features." A unique feature of the case study 
approach is that its focus is not to define a population and select an appropriate sample, but 
rather it is focused around "determining what the investigated case may be" (Sagadin 2004:34). 
Further, a case study is usually a study of a singular case or a small number of cases. Starman 
(2013:35) asserted that "The idea of representative sampling and statistical generalizations to a 
wider population should be rejected, and analytical induction should be chosen instead." Mesec 
(1998) supported this notion and suggested that researchers should select a case for a research 
unit where a problem or phenomenon that one is interested in exists. George and Bennett 
(2005:19) identified four advantages of qualitative case studies compared to quantitative 
methods:   
Their potential to achieve high conceptual validity, strong procedures for fostering new 
hypotheses, usefulness for closely examining the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms 
in the context of individual cases, and their capacity for addressing causal complexity. 
 
In terms of validity, rather than lumping together cases that are dissimilar in order to obtain a 
larger sample size as done in quantitative work, the qualitative case study approach allows for 
"conceptual refinements with a higher validity level over fewer number of cases" (2005:19). It 
also takes into account the contextual factors other than those that are codified that quantitative 
research tends to leave unaccounted for. Overall, the qualitative case study is helpful when "we 
want to cover contextual conditions because we believe they are relevant to the phenomenon 
under study or when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clear" (Baxter 
and Jack 2008:545). Qualitative research methods are preferred over quantitative methods in this 
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research because it is focused on a specific, localized phenomenon. By utilizing the qualitative 
case study method it was possible to achieve a more in depth understanding of the phenomenon 
being studied. It also gave the researcher the ability to develop a detailed account to portray it.  
 
PROCEDURES AND INSTRUMENTATION 
 The case study approach used herein utilized the chronological temporal approach 
followed by themes and included the use of primary and secondary data which were collected 
based upon their relevancy to U.S. foreign policy utilized in Iraq and the subsequent formation of 
ISIS. The chronological temporal approach was chosen because it allowed for the ability to track 
down the root cause of the phenomenon in question. Primary data sources included declassified 
federal intelligence agency documents, joint U.S.-Iraqi documents, U.S. strategic framework, 
agreements, and contingency plans for Iraq, various memos and addresses given by high ranking 
political figures regarding U.S. action in Iraq, as well as United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) expert reports on Iraq. Secondary data sources included academic books and journal 
articles, prior case studies, and relevant news reports which were used for the purpose of 
providing additional background and contextual information to guide the analysis. After 
chronological ordering, the data were then manually coded for all U.S. policies, practices, and 
actions utilized in Iraq that included underlying themes of realpolitik and neo-liberalism using 
color coded signifiers.  All information and reference to privatization, deregulation, free-market 
economic practices, regime change, and geopolitical interests were then coded and separated into 
the appropriate theme.  
 Rather than an emphasis on reliability and validity as in quantitative research, qualitative 
research, particularly case studies, are more concerned with achieving a deeper understanding of 
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the phenomenon being studied. Trochim and Donnelly (2008:148) note that "each of us sees a 
different reality because we see it from a different perspective and through different 
experiences." Therefore, there is no single reality that exists separate from individual 
perceptions. Due to the interpretative nature of the research presented in this study, reliability is 
limited. Similarly, in qualitative work validity is often difficult to prove. Guba and Lincoln 
(1981) proposed that transferability and confirmability should be used to judge the soundness of 
qualitative research rather than reliability and validity. Transferability refers to the "degree to 
which the results of qualitative research can be transferred to other contexts or settings," and 
confirmability refers to the "degree to which others can confirm or corroborate the results in 
qualitative research" (Trochim and Donnelly 2008:149). In this study, transferability is limited 
because the focus is on a specific phenomenon, U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and the development 
of ISIS. However, due to the striking similarities between U.S. actions and involvement in Iraq 
to that of Syria, the results of this study are transferable and applicable in that context. Outside of 
these specific cases, the transferability of this study is limited. Likewise, the international arena 
is ever changing. More specifically, the Middle East has been in a constant state of turmoil and 
has been subjected to the influence of a multitude of external actors. Due to these factors, 
confirmability of this study is also limited. However, by acknowledging the ever changing nature 
of the international arena, and thus the study at hand, this increases the level of dependability, or 
"the degree to which the researcher adequately describes the continuously changing context and 







 Once the coded data mentioned in the previous section were chronologically ordered and 
established into themes, it then provided the factual events necessary to analyze the complexities 
of U.S. foreign policy which was suggested to constitute the use of realpolitik and neo-
liberalism, specifically in the case of Iraq. A chronological temporal analysis of the development 
of ISIS as a result of this foreign policy being utilized, coded to contain privatization, 
deregulation, free-market economic practices, regime change, and geopolitical interests, was then 
preformed. The results of this analysis were then applied to Syria in an effort to obtain a 
complete understanding of the potential of U.S. foreign policy to result in the rise of violent 
extremist groups such as ISIS.    
 
LIMITATIONS 
 As with any research method there are limitations that should be noted. One of the 
biggest issues in regards to the use of qualitative case studies is that of generalizability. When 
focusing on a singular case, or a grouping of similar cases, it is impractical to try to generalize 
the findings to include instances outside those particular cases. Flyvbjerg (2006) notes that, 
within sociological research, there is a preconceived notion that in it is impossible to generalize 
findings on the basis of an individual case. Rather, the focus tends to zero in on specific 
phenomenon that occur within a specific case. Another issue that arises when utilizing the 
qualitative case study approach is the possibility of a bias towards verification. This meaning that 
there is "a tendency to confirm the researcher's preconceived notions (Starman 2013:38). Due to 
the time constraints of this particular study, there is also the issue of the data collected not being 
all inclusive and exhaustive. Beyond the limitations that are associated with the use of the case 
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study method, there are also issues when using governmental and politically driven documents. 
Specifically, Rothe and Collins (2011:27) note that "there is an issue of selectivity of information 
provided by the source as well as full disclosure of information..given the overall process of 
knowledge management." There is also the issue of censoring, much of the documentation on 
U.S. involvement in Iraq is still classified information, and those that have been de-classified are 
still heavily censored. Given the issue of access to the full array of information, the possibility of 
an incomplete picture of the case being illustrated is present.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter outlined the importance of qualitative analysis as well as the case study 
design. It also provided an overview of the research design, the reasoning behind the selection of 
Iraq as the case, a description of the data, as well as the procedures and analysis being used in the 
study. The follow chapter will provide a detailed description of integrated theory and its 
















 As a discipline, criminological research attempts to understand the causal factors of crime 
and crime control. These attempts have produced a multitude of theories that are applied to street 
crime. While there is a plethora of criminological theories available with the capacity to explain 
individual street crimes, standing alone these theories fail to explain the complexity of state 
crime. In order to fully understand state crime, a multi-level integrated theory of crime is 
necessary. Further, utilizing only one theory, which in turn uses only one level of analysis, has 
the potential to lead to reductionism. Rothe (2009b:99) further explains this phenomenon by 
stating that: 
Utilizing theories that explain only the individual level processes, that organizations, 
controls, or external precipitating conditions, is bound to overlook the intricacies of such 
cases and provide no additional guidance for future understandings of atrocities or the 
ability to foresee potential situations prior to becoming full-blown violations of 
international criminal law. 
 
Therefore, individual theories that explain only one level of analysis overlooks the inherent 
details of complex state crimes which in turn fail to produce any complete future understanding 
of this phenomenon.  
 The first attempt to create an integrated multi-level theory began with Kramer and 
Michalowski’s (1990) study regarding state-corporate crime. This work was further expanded 
upon by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) in their integrated theoretical frame. In this theoretical 
frame the three catalysts for action including motivation, opportunity, and operationality of 
controls were viewed as being constant factors in state crime at the interactional (micro), 
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organizational (meso), and institutional (macro) levels of analysis (Rothe 2008). While this 
theory was instrumental in its foundation, it was criticized for its emphasis on the capitalistic 
viewpoint and social organization which gave it a very westernized and United States centered 
focus. Thus, this viewpoint limits the theory to those crimes that are directly associated with the 
capitalistic corporate culture generated primarily by, and within, the United States. Further, 
Rothe and Mullins (2006, 2008) assert that the theory fails to address vital aspects of state crime 
such as “weakened and transnational states, the involvement of militias, ideological and religious 
motivating factors, international relations, and factors associated with post-colonialism” (Rothe 
2008:51). To add girth and explanatory power to Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) theory, Rothe 
and Mullins (2006, 2007, 2008) proposed an integrated theory of violations of international 
criminal laws, the likes of which will be utilized in this thesis. Rothe and Mullins (2006, 2008) 
added an international level of analysis to the original framework in order to incorporate the 
international nature of state crime which was previously overlooked. This level of analysis 
includes “international relations, controls, political pressures, overarching ideological and 
political interests, and economic and military positions of the particular states involved” (Rothe 
2008:52). This new theory also separated Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) catalyst of 
operationality of control into constraints and controls. Constraints are defined as “social elements 
that stand to potentially make a crime either riskier or less successful; offenders must navigate 
around them” (Rothe 2008:52).  Controls are defined as “a complete blockage to an act or when 
a criminal penalization is ideally inevitable after the fact” (2008:52). Simply put, a constraint 
acts as a barrier such as oversight from the United Nations, whereas a control is an institution 
that has the ability to completely prevent the criminal action or punish the violation after the 
crime has been committed. Furthermore, the four revised catalysts constituted in the revised 
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theory include motivation, or the “constellation of the general and specific drives that lure and 
entice a given organization/organizational actor toward offending,” opportunity, or the “social 
interactions where the possibility for a crime to be committed emerges and presents itself to a 
motivated offender,” constraints, and controls, which have been previously defined (Rothe 
2009b:107). Within each of the catalysts and levels are several individual criminological 
theories, though most are implicitly present (e.g. political economy). The following section 
draws these out as they are relevant to this study as well as provides discussions of other related 
theoretical frameworks.  
 
THEORY INTEGRATION 
Within the overarching integrated theory of violations of international criminal laws, 
Foucault’s (1980) premise of regimes of truth will be the primary framework guiding this 
research. Foucault emphasized the reinforcing role between power and truth. He believed power 
to be more than just a coercive force, rather that mechanisms of power “the means in which it is 
dispersed – produce knowledge that reinforces the exercise of that power” (Rothe and Friedrichs 
2015:69). Further, truth is constructed by those who hold political and economic positions of 
power. These truths then benefit those who wield power within a society. Foucault (1977:74) 
asserts that  
Truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. Truth is linked in a 
circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of 
power which it induces and which extends it: a “regime” of truth. 
 
Simply stated, truth is created and reinforced by power; those who are in power create truths and 
proclaim them to be absolute. Rothe and Friedrichs (2015) make evident the ability of the 
Foucauldian notions of truth and regimes of truth to reinforce the concept of development. The 
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established truths guide the way in which development is discussed. The overarching regime of 
truth, which is inherently created out of state and corporate interests, guides this development. 
These established truths then undergirds actions within the international arena and become what 
Vico (1948:63) refers to as “judgment without reflection.” Once this has occurred, it becomes the 
generalized way of thinking and leaves no room for alternative methods to the proposed 
solutions. These truths are then manifested within the overarching regimes of truth which uphold 
the status quo. As previously discussed, if these truths are questioned or threatened, actors 
rationalize their actions. Rothe and Friedrichs (2015:71) simplify this phenomenon in stating that 
“the regime of truth supports the status quo, appears as common sense and as if consensually 
accepted.” This accepted way of thinking is then passed on to individual actors and is 
subsequently carried on even when the actors themselves leave. Subsequently, policy is then 
dictated by these created truths and becomes entrenched within the institution. 
 These truths however are embedded within state interests grounded in neo-liberalism. As 
such, the overarching umbrella of these ‘truths’ and ‘regime of truth’ is realpolitik: states’ 
prioritization of self-interests embedded within the political economic and military spheres. The 
realpoIitik theoretical frame goes beyond the dichotomous relationship of politics and the 
economy to include geopolitical interests in order to explain state policy. In this case, realpolitik 
can be seen to be utilized by powerful countries situated in the global west in order to legitimize 
their actions through the adoption of certain discourses, namely condemning oppressive and 
opposing regimes, while at the same time pursuing avenues that benefit their own political and 
economic interest. This theoretical frame is useful in explaining U.S. foreign policy in Iraq given 
the historical economic and political relations of the United States with the resource rich 
countries of the Middle East. 
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 While some researchers (Gelfand, Lefree, Fahey, and Feinberg 2013 and Conrad and 
Milton 2013) have used cultural differences as a theoretical framework to explain U.S. action in 
Iraq and Syria and the subsequent power vacuums that are created, this framework fails to 
explain the totality of the criminal activity that has taken place in that it only examines one level 
of analysis. By utilizing the integrated theory of violations of international criminal laws, 
specifically focusing on Foucalt’s regimes of truth as a framework and realpolitik, also called 
geopolitical interests, this research will be able to provide a more holistic explanation to the U.S. 






















The following chapter provides a case study analysis of the United States’ actions in both 
Iraq and Syria and how this action led to the rise of extremists groups, in particular ISIS. 
Specifically, this section highlights U.S. involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom and post-
occupation Iraq and Syria, as well as the formation and development of ISIS. 
 
IRAQ 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 The latest U.S. military action in Iraq began in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Directly following the attack, in his 2002 State of the Union Address 
President Bush included Iraq in a list of states the makeup an "axis of evil" in stating that, 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the 
peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave 
and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means 
to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United 
States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic (The 
Washington Post 2002:1). 
 
On October 16, 2002 the Joint Congressional Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States 
Armed Forces against Iraq was passed. Within which it was stated that, 
Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-388) expressed the sense of congress 
that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remover from power 
the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to 




On January 28, 2003 President George W. Bush gave his State of the Union Address in which he 
warned the citizen of the United States about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq and his 
plan to disarm him if he failed to comply with the United Nations, stating that, 
The United States will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene on February the 5th to 
consider the facts of Iraq's ongoing defiance of the world. Secretary of State Powell will 
present information and intelligence about Iraqi's--Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its 
attempts to hide those weapons from inspectors and its links to terrorist groups. We will 
consult, but let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm 
for the safety of our people, and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to 




, 2003 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, keeping with the President’s State of 
the Union Address, appealed to the United Nations that Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, 
posed an imminent threat to the United States and to his own people due to his possession of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, on February 14, 2003 the United Nations’ Chief 
Weapons Inspector, Hans Blix reported to the United Nations Security Council that his team 
“has found no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq” (CNN 2015:2). Despite these findings, on 
March 17, 2003 President George W. Bush issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq 
within 48 hour or face military action. The following day, Hussein spoke on Iraqi television 
where he called the coalition’s attacks “shameful crimes against Iraq and humanity” (2015:2). 
That same day the United States invaded Iraq, marking the beginning of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. On April 9, 2003 coalition forces took Baghdad and toppled the statue of Saddam 
Hussein in Firdos Square. Vice President Dick Cheney stated that “the day's events in Baghdad 
will mark one of the most extraordinary military campaigns ever conducted” (DePalma 2003:1). 
Further, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld “compared the collapse of Mr. Hussein's regime 
to the fall of the Berlin Wall and said Mr. Hussein had taken his place in the pantheon of failed 
dictators” (2003:1). Following the defeat of Baghdad, while aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln 
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President Bush declared that major combat operations in Iraq were over on May 1, 2003. Despite 
this, the fighting continued. Following the end of major combat operations in Iraq, Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 1 (2003a), was established on May 16, 2003. It 
called for the de-Ba'athification of Iraq in which the Ba'ath party, the political party associated 
with the Hussein regime, was disestablished and barred from holding prominent ranks within the 
Iraqi military, and from holding positions in the top three layers of management in the national 
government ministry and related institutions. On May 22, 2003 the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 1483 which acknowledged the United States and Great Britain as 
occupiers of Iraq. The Council determined that, 
The situation in Iraq still constitutes a threat to international peace and security; 
consequently the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which 
gives the Council authority to make decisions that are binding on all U.N. member states 
(Kirgis 2003:1)  
 
Further, Resolution 1483 did not give any indication of the lawfulness of the invasion. However, 
it did recognize the United States and Great Britain as the occupying powers in Iraq and called 
upon the occupying forces to fully comply with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and The Hague 
Regulations of 1907 (2003). The following day, CPA Order Number 2 (2003b) was issued and 
completed the de-Baathification of Iraq by resolving jobs, titles, and entire agencies associated 
with the Ba'ath party. It also left the door open in regards to dissolved entities in that it cited that 
"additional organizations may be added to this list in the future" (Coalition 2003b:188). One 
month later on June 22, 2003 Saddam Hussein’s sons, Uday and Qusay, were killed by U.S. 
coalition forces. Later that year on December 13
th
 Saddam Hussein was captured in Tikrit, 
however this was not confirmed by the U.S. Defense Department until December 14, 2003. 
Following the invasion of Iraq by the United States as well as the downfall of the Hussein 
regime, which divided the Shiite ruling party from the marginalized Sunnis, there was an 
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increase in sectarian and insurgency violence. On March 8, 2004 the CPA issued a Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL) in order to govern the restoration of sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 
2004. Within which it stated that, 
The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic and pluralistic, 
and powers shall be shared between the federal government and the regional 
governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administration (Law 2004:204).  
 
From April to May of 2004, Shiite militias who were loyal to Moqtada Sadr engaged the 
coalition forces. After a month long siege of the Sunni city of Falluja, hundreds were reported as 
being killed. It was also during this time that photographic evidence of U.S. troops abusing Iraqi 
prisoners at Abu Gharib emerged. In June of 2004, the United States handed over sovereignty to 
the interim Iraqi government headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Two days later, the 
coalition turned over legal control of Saddam Hussein and other former top Iraqi officials to the 
Iraqi government. However, the United States retained physical custody of the men. Hussein was 
charged with a multitude of crimes including the illegal invasion of Kuwait and the gassing of 
the Kurdish people on July 1, 2004 (CNN: 2015). In August of 2004, fighting ensued between 
joint U.S. and Iraqi forces and the Shiite insurgency militia of Moqtada Sadr in Najaf. Two 
months later the United States mounted a major offensive against insurgents in Falluja in which 
2,000 insurgents were killed. On November 14, 2004 Fallujah was declared as being liberated. In 
April of 2005, despite escalating insurgency violence, the National Assembly selected Kurdish 
leader Jalal Talabani as President and Ibrahim Jaafari as Vice President of Iraq. In May of 2006, 
the newly elected Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, announced the creation of a national 
unity government. In his address to the nation, President Bush (2006:1) asserted that, “this 
Saturday in Baghdad, the new Prime Minister of Iraq announced a national unity government. 
This is a free government under a democratic constitution, and its formation marks a victory for 
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the cause of freedom in the Middle East." The following June, Massoud Barzani was sworn in as 
Regional President of Iraqi Kurdistan. In August of 2005, following CPA orders, a draft 
Constitution was endorsed by both Shiite and Kurdish negotiators. However, it was not endorsed 
by Sunni representatives. That October Iraqi voters approved the new Constitution and aimed to 
create “an Islamic Federal Democracy” (BBC 2015:7). Tensions rose between the United States 
and Iraq in November of 2005 when 24 Iraqi civilians were killed in Haditha, Iraq. Eight United 




 Marine Regiment were charged with the 
deaths. However, only one was convicted of “negligent dereliction of duty” (CNN 2015:3). In 
December the first permanent Iraqi government and parliament was elected, making the first full-
term Iraqi government since the U.S. invasion. Following the implementation of the new Iraqi 
government, the United Nations estimated that an average of over 100 civilians were killed in 
Iraq each day (BBC 2015). Despite these numbers, on June 7, 2006 Iraqi insurgents faced a 
decisive defeat when the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was killed 
during a joint U.S. air strike. 
 The Iraqi High Tribunal reached a verdict in the 1982 Dujail massacre case finding 
Saddam Hussein guilty and sentencing him to death on November 5, 2006. On December 30, 
2006 Saddam Hussein was killed by hanging for committing crimes against humanity. The 
following January, President Bush addressed the nation and announced a new Iraq strategy in 
which he stated,  
The violence in Iraq — particularly in Baghdad — overwhelmed the political gains the 
Iraqis had made. Al Qaeda terrorists and Sunni insurgents recognized the mortal danger 
that Iraq's elections posed for their cause, and they responded with outrageous acts of 
murder aimed at innocent Iraqis. They blew up one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam — 
the Golden Mosque of Samarra — in a calculated effort to provoke Iraq's Shia population 
to retaliate. Their strategy worked. Radical Shia elements, some supported by Iran, 
formed death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that 
continues today (Serrano 2007:1). 
44 
 
With this new strategy U.S. troop levels in Iraq and Baghdad surged to 150,000. In the months 
that followed, insurgency violence in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi killed over 500 Iraqi and 
Kurdish civilians. In August of 2007, the Kurds and the Shiites form an alliance behind Prime 
Minister Maliki, however they again failed to garnish the support of the Sunni leaders. In 
September of 2007, the United States faced backlash over private security contractors after 
Blackwater security guards were alleged to have killed 17 civilians in Baghdad. Despite this, on 
November 26, 2007, President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel 
Al-Maliki signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and 
Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America. Within the 
Declaration the parties pledged to "begin as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before 
July 31, 2008, agreements between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, 
economic, and security spheres" (Mason 2009:4). The intentions of both parties to enter into an 
agreement that would provide U.S. security assurance to Iraq as well as train and assist the Iraqi 
army with terrorist entities, specifically Al Qaeda, within the territory were also asserted. In 
January of 2008, Parliament reversed CPA Orders One and Two and passed legislation “allowing 
former officials from Saddam Hussein’s Baath party to return to public office” (BBC 2015:9). 
On July 10, 2008 General David Petraeus was confirmed by U.S. Senate as commander of U.S. 
Central Command. Six days later the January surge officially ended resulting in the reduction of 
U.S. troop levels in Iraq about which General Petraeus told Congress, 
The first of those units could be sent home in late September, with the rest returning 
home by mid-July 2008. Petraeus said the "surge" campaign has met its military goals of 
reducing sectarian killings by more than 50 percent nationwide and by more than 80 
percent in Baghdad (CNN 2007:1). 
 
In September of 2008 the United States relinquished control of the western province of Anbar 
which was once an al-Qaeda stronghold in the area. This transfer marked the first Sunni province 
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to be returned to the Shiite headed government. The following month, Iraqi Parliament approved 
the U.S-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement which determined the “principal provisions and 
requirements that regulate the temporary presence, activities, and withdrawal of the United States 
Forces from Iraq” (Agreement 2008:1). By January of 2009, the United States military handed 
over control of Baghdad's Green Zone to the Iraqi government. With this, Iraq assumed more 
control over foreign troops based in the country. Prime Minister Al-Maliki marked the move as 
"Iraq's day of sovereignty" (BBC 2015:10). Shortly afterwards, President Barrack Obama 
announced that August 31, 2010 would be the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, noting that 
upwards of 50,000 troops would stay and act as military advisors to protect U.S. interests, but 
they would be gone by the end of 2011. That June, U.S. troops pulled out of major Iraqi cities 
and towns officially transferring security responsibility over to Iraqi security forces. Small 
amounts of troops remained in rural areas of Iraq to combat insurgency activity.  
 Following the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops, multiple suicide bombings in Baghdad 
from August to December of 2009 claimed by the al-Qaeda linked Islamic State killed over 300 
Iraqi civilians (BBC 2015). On August 19, 2010 the last remaining combat brigade pulled out of 
Iraq. President Obama announced that, "Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people 
now have lead responsibility for the security of their country" (Montopoli 2010:1). To reflect the 
reduced role of the United States in Iraq and the increased role of Iraqi security forces in 
securing the country, Operation Iraqi Freedom was renamed Operation New Dawn in September 
of 2010. During the same time, Iraq and Syria restored diplomatic ties. After four years of self-
imposed exile in Iran, Moqtada Sadr returned to Iraq in January of 2011. Following his return, 
sectarian violence escalated culminating in 40 coordinated nationwide attacks in August. On 
October 21, 2011 President Obama announced that all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Iraq 
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by the end of the year stating that, "After nearly 9 year, America' war in Iraq will be over" 
(Montopoli 2010:1). On December 15, 2011 U.S. troops lowered the flag of command over 
Baghdad, officially ending military operations in Iraq. Three days later the last of the U.S. troops 
in Iraq crossed the border into Kuwait, marking the end of U.S. occupation of Iraq.  
 
Post U.S. Occupation 
 After the withdrawal of most U.S. forces in December of 2011, the unity government of 
Iraq became disentangled when arrest warrants were issued for Sunni Vice President Tariq al-
Hashemi resulting in Sunni boycotts in both the parliament and the cabinet (BBC 2015). By 
December of 2012, Sunni Muslims organized mass rallies spanning several months in response 
to their marginalization by the predominately Shiite lead government. In response, security 
forces were called in to suppress the anti-government protests resulting in 50 civilian casualties 
sparking anger among the already disgruntled Sunnis. By July of 2013 insurgency violence 
skyrocketed and the country was described as being "yet again in a full-blown sectarian war" 
(2015:13). In response to Iraqi Kurdish support for the Kurds fighting jihadist in Syria, the al-
Qaeda affiliated Islamic State of Iraq unleashed a series of bombings in the Kurdish capital of 
Irbil in September of 2013. After increasing tensions in the Sunni populated Anbar province, 
which was previously under U.S. control, insurgency forces recaptured both Fallujah and 
Ramadi. By the end of January Iraqi security forces retook Ramadi, but were unable to rid 
Fallujah of rebel fighters. From June to September of 2014 the disenfranchised Sunnis of Iraq 
turned to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) for support. By doing so, they were able 
to expand out of the Anbar province and take the major city of Mosul, and the critical Mosul 
dam located there. In response, Kurdish forces assisted by the United States and Iran conducted 
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multiple airstrikes near Mosul about which President Obama commented, " If that dam was 
breached it could have proven catastrophic, with floods that would have threatened the lives of 
thousands of civilians and endangered our embassy compound in Baghdad" (Mullen and 
Capelouto 2014:1). Following the joint airstrikes on Mosul, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
declared a caliphate and renamed itself as the Islamic State.  
 In September of 2014, President Obama announced a new forward strategy against the 
Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria stating that, 
I have made it clear that we will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever 
they are...That means I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as 
Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: if you threaten America, you will find no 
safe haven (Cohen 2014:1). 
 
The new strategy included increased air raids supporting Iraqi operations near Baghdad, the 
authorization of sending military advisors to Iraq, and an international conference in Paris to 
form a U.S. led coalition against the Islamic State in which Iran and Syria were excluded. By 
January of 2015, the U.S. led coalition had launched over 900 airstrikes against militant targets 
located in Iraq (CNN 2015). In April of 2015 Iraqi forces retook Tikrit, however a month later 
the Islamic State captured the key Iraqi city of Rramadi. By the end of 2015, Iraqi forces 
recaptured the Tamim district of Ramadi, however the remainder of the city remained under the 
control of the Islamic State.   
 
SYRIA  
 Following President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address, Syria became associated 
with the aforementioned "Axis of Evil," marking them as a "grave and growing danger" against 
the United States (The Washington Post 2002:1). In May of 2002 Undersecretary of State John 
Bolton claimed that Damascus was acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Following 
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these allegations in April of 2003 the United States threatened Syria with sanctions if they failed 
to comply with demands to end their support of terrorism groups as well as stop the development 
of WMD. New York Congressman Eliot Engel stated that, 
We can have normal diplomatic relations with them, if they act like a decent nation. But 
if they continue to do the things we talked about, support terrorism, occupy Lebanon, and 
develop weapons of mass destruction, it's time to get tough with them (Voices of 
America 2009:1)  
 
The following October, Israel, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East, launched an airstrike against a 
Palestinian militant camp located near Damascus. An action in which Syria claimed to be an act 
of military aggression. Despite previous warnings to Syria by the United States, Syria refused to 
comply. Therefore, in May of 2004 President Bush Signed Executive Order 13338, officially 
implementing the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SAA). This 
Act listed a multitude of Syrian misdeeds including, "support for terrorism, undermining stability 
in Iraq, continued meddling in Lebanon, and ongoing development of WMD and ballistic missile 
programs" (Schenker 2006:1). The killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri sparked 
anti-Syrian protests in Beirut resulting in the United States urging Syria to withdraw its forces 
from Lebanon. In April of 2005, Syria complied. Also following the controversial assassination 
of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiki Hariri, the United States recalled its ambassador to 
Damascus. On September 12, 2006 the U.S. embassy in Damascus was attacked by four armed 
Islamic gunmen. In response to the attack, the Syrian Embassy in Washington stated that, 
It is regrettable that U.S. policies in the Middle East have fueled extremism, terrorism 
and anti-U.S. sentiment...The U.S. should take this opportunity to review its policies in 
the Middle East and start looking at the root causes of terrorism and broker a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East (Roumani 2006:1)  
 
Despite the security breach of the U.S. embassy in Damascus, Washington praised the Syrian 
guards who combated the attackers. In the month that followed, the United States and Syria 
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restored diplomatic relations. This restored relationship was tested in April of 2007 when U.S. 
House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi met President Assad in Damascus, in which she 
faced major backlash from Washington who favored a hard line approach to isolate the country. 
Despite this, the following month Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Foreign 
Minister Walid Muallem. 
 In September of 2007 Israel carried out another airstrike, this time targeting northern 
Syria alleging that a nuclear facility was being constructed. In March of 2008 Syria hosted the 
Arab League summit. Pro-Western countries, specifically Saudi Arabia and Egypt, sent low level 
delegates in order to protest Syria's stance on Lebanon resulting in a political deadlock. The 
following month the United States accused North Korea of assisting Syria in building a nuclear 
reactor, the same reactor which Israel claimed to have bombed in 2007 (BBC 2016). The 
diplomatic isolation by the west ended in July of 2008 when French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
met with President Assad in Paris. This continued into March of 2009 when the assistant U.S. 
Secretary of State for the Near East, Jeffery Feltman visited Syria along with White House 
National Security Aide Daniel Shapiro. Within the same month, trading began in Syria's stock 
exchange, "in a gesture towards liberalizing the state-controlled economy" (2016:11). While 
investigating the U.S. claims that the site of the 2007 Israeli raid was a nuclear reactor in June of 
2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) divulged that they had “discovered new 
traces of uranium of a type not included in Syria’s declared nuclear material” (Bell 2009:1). The 
following month, amid strained relations with Israel, U.S. special envoy George Mitchell met 
with President Assad to broker peace between Syria and Israel. During so, Mitchell told Assad 
that President Obama was “determined to facilitate a truly comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace” 
(BBC 2009:1). Even though Syria and Iraq restored diplomatic relations in 2006, in response to 
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allegations regarding the responsibility for insurgency bombings in Baghdad, Iraq and Syria 
recalled their envoys in August of 2009 (BBC 2016). After a five year absence in Syria 
following the attack on the U.S. Embassy, in February of 2010 the United States reassigned an 
ambassador to Damascus. However, the following May President Obama renewed sanctions 
against Syria citing that Syria’s, 
Continuing support for terrorist organizations and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction 
and missile programs, continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States (BBC 2010). 
 
Specifically noted was Assad’s provisions of Scud missiles to Hezbollah militants located in 
Lebanon, which directly violated United Nations resolutions. In the spring of 2011 violent 
protests began in Deraa resulting in Syrian tanks entering the towns of Deraa, Banya, Homs, and 
Damascus in order to suppress the anti-regime protests (BBC 2016). At the same time, the 
United States as well as the European Union continued to impose increasingly strict sanctions on 
Assad. In June of 2011, the IAEA formally decided to report Syria to the United Nations 
Security Council regarding the reactor destroyed in the 2007 air raid conducted by Israel. The 
IAEA’s board of governors noted that, 
Syria claims that an installation at Dair Alzour, destroyed by an air strike in September 
2007, was a military non-nuclear installation and not a clandestine nuclear reactor site. 
However, as the IAEA resolution notes, the country has not supplied documentation to 
support its claims and has not allowed the agency to confirm its assertions about the non-
nuclear nature of the destroyed building (World Nuclear News 2011:1). 
 
The following months saw a spike in anti-regime protests and internal and external exiles of 
opposition activists. This resulted in the November 2011 suspension of Syria from the Arab 
League which cited Assad’s failure to uphold the Arab peace plan (BBC 2016). Furthering the 
unrest, in May of 2012 Syrian diplomats in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, 
Canada, and Australia were expelled to protest the murder of civilians in Houla by the Assad 
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regime. The following month Syria shot down a Turkish plane. In response, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton asserted that the United States condemned the attack and that it is, "yet another 
reflection of the Syrian authorities' callous disregard for international norms, human life and 
peace and security" (Tuysuz 2012:1). In conjunction with Senator Clinton's remarks, President 
Obama further warned Assad to neither utilize nor transport chemical or biological weapons or 
else risk crossing the “red line” which would invoke a military response from the United States 
(CNN 2012). In November of 2012 the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces formed in Qatar and were formally recognized as a legitimate representative 
of the Syrian people by the United States and its allies in the following month (BBC 2016). In 
March of 2013 the Syrian city of Raqqa was seized by the Operation National Coalition. In 
return, Assad's warplanes bombed the city. As a result, the United States and Great Britain 
pledged to provide non-military aid to the rebel forces. After previous efforts failed, the United 
States and Russia came to an agreement on the framework of Syria's chemical weapons in 
September of 2013. It was noted that in accordance with the agreed upon timeline, 
Initial inspections of declared chemical weapons sites must be completed by November; 
all production and mixing and filling equipment must be destroyed by November; and all 
chemical weapons material must be eliminated by mid-2014 (Smith-Spark and Cohen 
2013:1).  
 
The following month, President Obama permitted internationally sanctioned inspectors to begin 
destroying Assad's chemical weapons as per the U.S.-Russian agreement. After Islamic rebels 
captured a major Free Syrian Army bases in northern Syria, the United States and Great Britain 
officially suspended their non-military aid in December of 2013. The following January peace 
talks in Geneva sponsored by the United Nations failed as the Assad regime refused to discuss 
the creation of a transitional governing body. The following June, the United Nation announced 
that the removal of Syria's chemical weapons was complete.  
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 In June of 2014 the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) declared a caliphate in the 
territories it conquered in Iraq and Syria. In September the United States in conjunction with five 
other Arab nations conducted a bombing raid on Raqqa, the self-dictated capital of the newly 
established caliphate. After which President Obama asserted that, "once again, it must be clear to 
anyone who would plot against America and try to do Americans harm that we will not tolerate 
safe havens for terrorists who threaten our people" (Carter, Labott, and Sciutto 2014:1). 
Although the Kurdish Peshmerga pushed ISIS out of Kobane in January of 2015, ISIS fighters 
captured the city of Palmyra in central Syria in May. In doing so they also secured the last 
remaining border crossing into Iraq. The following June ISIS fighters regained Kobane and 
Hassekeh from Kurdish forces. In September of 2015 Russia conducted controversial airstrikes 
in Syria in which the Russian Defense Ministry claimed to target ISIS "arms, transportation, 
communications and control positions" (Payne, Star, and Cullinane 2015:1). However, U.S. 
officials questioned Russia's target intentions stating that, "a Russian airstrike near the Syrian 
city of Homs has no strategic purpose in terms of combating ISIS, which shows they are not 
there to go after ISIL" (2015:1).  
 
THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) 
 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) got its roots in the militant group Jamaat al-
Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AMZ) (Hashim 2014). After the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan JTJ moved into Iraq and created a partnership with the Partisans of 
Islam, Ansar al-Islam. Following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the disbanding of the 
Hussein regime, the disenfranchised Sunni population launched a five group insurgency 
campaign. These groups consisted of "Iraqis from the former regime, nationalists, tribal 
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elements, various Islamist fighters", and al-Zarqawi's JTJ. Their main objective was to "force a 
withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq" (2014:70). In October of 2004, al-Zarqawi pledged 
allegiance to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and merged the JTJ, creating Tanzim Qaidate al-
Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In doing so, AQI provided al-Qaeda with a 
base which was needed to attack the United States (2014). After attempting to spark a sectarian 
uprising by uniting the Iraqi Sunnis against the majority Shiites, al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. 
airstrike on June 7, 2006. Following his death, Abu Ayyub al-Masri was appointed as the AQI 
representative in Iraq (2014). However, al-Masri's reign was short lived; in October of 2006 al-
Masri announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and named Abu Omar al-
Baghdadi as the leader (CNN 2016). Following the creation of ISI, the Sahwa movement took 
root and disgruntled Sunni insurgents allied with the United States in order to defeat ISI in return 
for integration into the Iraqi security forces (2014). However, the Iraqi government was unable to 
keep the promises given to the Sahwa militias causing deep seeded discontent (Kavalek 2015). In 
the beginning of 2009, the United States began to pull out of Iraq, leaving the task of security 
enforcement to the Iraqi security forces. By doing so, ISI gained significant ground in sabotaging 
the Iraqi government and many disgruntled Sahwa fighters defected to ISI. However, in April of 
2010 Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri were killed in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid in Tikrit, 
after which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the leader of ISI. In April of 2013, ISI combined with 
the al-Qaeda backed Syrian group Jabhat al-Nusra. As a result, Al-Baghdadi stated that the group 
would be known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). However, Abu Mohammad 
al-Jawlani, the leader of the Al-Nusra Front, rejected Al-Baghdadi's attempted absorption of the 
group (2016). On February 3, 2014 al-Qaeda's General Command renounced their ties to ISIS 
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and stated that "ISIS is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group...does not have an organizational 
relationship with it and [al-Qaeda] is not the group responsible for their actions" (Sly 2014:1). 
Despite being renounced by al-Qaeda, in June of 2014 ISIS took control of Mosul, Tikrit, 
and Al-Qaim, a town bordering Syria. Within the same month, the United Nations reported that 
one million Iraqis have been displaced as a result of insurgency activity (CNN 2016). On June 
29, 2014 ISIS leader al-Baghdadi announced the creation of a caliphate to be known as the 
Islamic State and asserted that, 
The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being 
nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their 
long slumber in the darkness of neglect — the time has come for them to rise (Vick 
2014:1). 
 
At the same time, al-Baghdadi also announced that ISIS would be further known as the Islamic 
State (IS). The following day, the United States authorized the sending of an additional 300 
troops to Iraq. In a letter to Congress, President Obama notated that these forces were deployed 
to protect U.S. citizens and interests and would remain until the security situation deescalated 
(CBS 2014). The following July ISIS took control the oil and gas fields in the Homs Province of 
Syria. In order to thwart the taking of the Kurdish capital of Irbil, the United States authorized 
targeted airstrikes on ISIS convoys and artillery units on August 8, 2014. Following the televised 
executions of U.S. journalist James Foley and British aid worker David Haines, the Unites States 
along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, carried out additional airstrikes against ISIS controlled oil 
refineries on September 23, 2014 in an attempt to cut off financing for its operations (Carter, 
Starr, and Tuysuz 2014). On November 14, 2014 the United Nation's Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic declared that ISIS had committed crimes 




By January of 2015 U.S. officials released that coalition airstrikes had killed upwards of 
6,000 ISIS fighters, "including half of the top command of the terror group" (Starr 2015:1). 
Despite these figures it was estimated that ISIS still had between 9,000 to 18,000 fighters and 
sympathizers (CNN 2016). On February 11, 2015 President Obama formally submitted a draft 
resolution to Congress to authorize the use of force against ISIL. Within his remarks to Congress 
President Obama stated that the strategy would include, 
A systemic and sustained campaign of airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, support 
and training for local forces on the ground, including the moderate Syrian opposition, 
preventing ISIL attacks, in the region and beyond, including by foreign terrorist fighters 
who try to threaten our countries, regional and international support for an inclusive Iraqi 
government that unites the Iraqi people and strengthens Iraqi forces against ISIL, and 
humanitarian assistance for the innocent civilians of Iraq and Syria, who are suffering so 
terribly under ISIL’s reign of horror (Office of the Press Secretary 2015:3). 
 
On March 7, 2015 Abubakar Shekau, the leader of the Nigerian based Boko Haram, pledged 
allegiance to ISIS via audio message. The following week a spokesperson for ISIS accepted 
Boko Haram’s pledge and claimed that the caliphate has expanded to western Africa (CNN 
2016). Following increasing amounts of violence in Syria, on May 16, 2015 United States 
special operations forces conducted a raid of al-Amr in eastern Syria, which acted as a 
stronghold that bridged ISIS controlled territory in Iraq and Syria (Dunham and Perry 2015). 
During the raid, a key ISIS leader, Abu Sayyaf, was killed. Despite the efforts of U.S. special 
operations forces, within the same month ISIS seized control of both Ramadi and Palmyra, 
which acted as the last Syria-Iraq border crossing under the control of the Syrian army (CNN 
2016). The following month the State Department released the Annual Terrorism Report and 
declared that ISIS had emerged as a greater threat than al-Qaeda (2016). In the months following 
its release, a string of attacks were executed by ISIS militants in Palmyra, Tunisia, Kuwait, 
Egypt, and Khan Bani Saad, Iraq, killing over 250 and injuring hundreds more. In August of 
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2015, ISIS destroyed historical artifacts in Palmyra, including the Temple of Baalshami. The 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declared the 
destruction of the Temple as being a war crime (2016). On November 12, 2015 the United States 
launched a drone attack in Raqqa, Syria targeting and killing Mohammed Emwazi, an Islamic 
militant also known as “Jihadi John” who was responsible for the beheading of numerous 
western citizens. Simultaneously, the United States Coalition offered air support to the 
Peshmerga in Sinjar. After two days of fighting, the Peshmerga pushed ISIS militants out of 
Sinjar and recaptured the city on November 13, 2015. This same day, militants affiliated with 
ISIS executed a coordinated attack on Paris, France. In response, the United States in 
conjunction with France and Great Britain conducted air raids on Raqqa, Syria targeting ISIS 




 The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq incited widespread opposition from the Iraqi 
people creating an environment which allowed extremist groups such as ISIS to thrive. The 
removal of the Hussein regime by the United States allowed for the deeply rooted sectarian 
schism between the ruling Shiites and the disenfranchised Sunnis to boil to the surface. After 
U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq, disgruntled Sunnis turned to radical insurgency groups for 
support. In turn, these groups were able take root in Iraq and spread into neighboring Syria. 
Similarly, as the United States attempts to remove Assad from power in Syria, ISIS creates a 
platform for which disenfranchised groups could bolster power and support. The following 
section will provided an analysis of the United States’ actions in both Iraq and Syria and the rise 
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of ISIS, specifically highlighting instances of regime change, geopolitical interests, privatization, 




























The following chapter provides a theoretically driven analysis of the United States’ 
actions in both Iraq and Syria and how this action led to the rise of extremist groups such as ISIS. 
In utilizing the integrated theory of violations of international criminal law, specifically 
highlighting Foucault’s Regimes of Truths and realpolitik or geopolitical interests, this section 
highlights instances of regime change, privatization, free-market economic changes, and 
deregulation in U.S. policy in Iraq and Syria. Since the events in Syria are still unfolding, only 
instances of regime change and geopolitical interest have been reported.  
 
IRAQ AND U.S. PRIORITIZATION OF REALPOLITIK AND THE EXERCISE OF 
GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AS PRIORITY 
Regime Change  
 In regards to U.S. support of regime change in Iraq, there is a multitude of evidence of 
the planning, the execution, and the aftermath of the forcible removal of Saddam Hussein from 
power. Five months after the events of September 11, 2001 the Bush administration shifted their 
focus from retaliating against Al Qaeda to targeting countries who were helping to equip these 
organizations. In his "Axis of Evil" State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush 




Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility towards America and to support terror...This is a 
regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens...This is a 
regime that has something to hide from the civilized world (Bush 2002b:60).  
 
In the months that followed, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice (2002:64) affirmed 
President Bush's concerns and asserted that "we must recognize that truly evil regimes will never 
be reformed. We must recognize that such regimes must be confronted, not coddled,” speaking 
specifically about the Hussein regime in Iraq. Furthering this idea, eight month before the U.S. 
and British invasion of Iraq, senior British officials met with Prime Minister Tony Blair at which 
there was a discussion of the Bush administration's determination to go to war. Matthew Rycroft, 
a British foreign policy aide, addressed reservations about the legality of the administration's call 
to war in the Downing Street Memo on July 23, 2002. Within which, Rycroft (2002:68) 
confirmed the administration's plan to remove Hussein from power stating that, "Bush wanted to 
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD 
(weapons of mass destruction)." Further, Rycroft wrote that "the defense secretary said that the 
U.S. had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime" (2002:68). 
Interestingly, the memo also mentioned that the Attorney-General specified that the desire for 
regime change was not a legal base for military action. In his article "Don't Attack Saddam" in 
the Wall Street Journal, Brent Scowcroft (2002:70) affirmed the administration's plans and 
asserted that "the Bush administration vows regime change, but states that no decision has been 
made whether, much less when, to launch an invasion." On August 26, 2002 Dick Cheney 
delivered a speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention in Nashville, 
Tennessee. Within this speech he confirmed the fear of the regime in stating that "armed with an 
arsenal of these weapons of terror, and seated atop 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, Saddam 
Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East" (Cheney 2002:78). 
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He continued on to explain the reasons as to which regime change would benefit the region and 
the international arena as a whole by stating that, 
Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the 
gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a 
chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace...With our help, a liberated Iraq 
can be a great nation once again (Cheney 2002:79).  
 
The decisive call for regime change in Iraq was emulated in George W. Bush's speech outlining 
the Iraqi threat given in Cincinnati, Ohio on October 7, 2002. Within which he presented a call to 
arms to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Bush (2002a:85) made clear that the United States 
government as a whole agreed that the regime was a danger to the country, and to the world and 
declared that "members of the congress of both political parties, and members of the United 
Nations Security Council, agree that Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace and must disarm." 
Further, Bush (2002a:87) asserted that U.S. military power is capable of defeating both regimes 
that harbor terrorists and the terrorist themselves by stating that "terror cells and outlaw regimes 
building WMD are different faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront both. 
And the United States military is capable of confronting both." This speech acted as the last ditch 
effort in requesting that the Hussein regime disarm themselves. The President further stated that 
"the time for denying, deceiving, and delaying has come to an end. Saddam Hussein must disarm 
himself--or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him" (2002a:89). However, 
the administration was skeptical that Hussein would voluntarily meet these requirements and 
asserted that the only way to ensure security would be to remove him from power.  
Unfortunately, at least so far, we have little reason to expect it. And that's why two 
administrations -- mine and President Clinton's -- have stated that regime change in Iraq 
is the only certain means of removing a great danger to our nation (2002a:89).  
 
The President went on to address fears that regime change could create instability in the region 
and assured the American people that the situation in Iraq could get no worse than it already is 
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for the Iraqi people. However, he vowed that if military action is necessary in Iraq, the United 
States and her allies would "help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy and create the 
institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors" (2002a:90). Nine days later, 
on October 16, 2002, the Joint Congressional Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States 
Armed Forces Against Iraq was passed. Within which it was stated that, 
Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-388) expressed the sense of congress 
that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power 
the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to 
replace that regime (Joint 2002:94).  
 
In a last ditch effort, President Bush issued a unilateral ultimatum to the Iraqi government to 
disarm. However, the administration had no expectations for the regime to obey. In his 
ultimatum to Iraq, President Bush (2003c:112) stated,  
Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within forty-eight hours. Their refusal to do 
so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing. For their own 
safety, all foreign nationals -- including journalists and inspectors -- should leave Iraq 
immediately... It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power.   
 
Two days later, on March 19, 2003 the President announced the start of Operation Iraq Freedom 
stating "we have no ambition in Iraq. Except to remove a threat and restore control of the country 
to its own people" (Bush 2003a:114). The following day, the United States invaded Iraq and 
dismantled the regime of Saddam Hussein. On May 1, 2003 aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln 
President Bush announced the end of major combat operation in Iraq. Within this announcement, 
the President addressed the overthrow of the Hussein regime and the transition in Iraq from 
dictatorship to democracy, stating that "the transition from dictatorship to democracy will take 
time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will 
leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq" (Bush 2003b:176).  
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 As stated in the Presidential Address on the End of Major Combat Actions in Iraq, after 
the Hussein regime was overthrown, the United States and her allies formed the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, tasked with providing a smooth transition from the previous authoritarian 
regime and promoting and ensuring the emergence of a new democratic Iraq. However, when 
British defense expert and CPA Director of Policy Planning, Andrew Rathmell analyzed the 
progress and shortcomings of the CPA in Iraq; he found that the elements necessary for 
successful policy were absent. Rathmell cited a lack of communication between Washington, 
Baghdad, and other portions of Iraq, a fragmented CPA organization as a whole, adoption of 
goals without necessary resources, inadequate debate when it came to policy implication, and 
non-existent plans for the aftermath of the invasion (Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sanchez, and Sayej 
2010). Rather than restructuring and leaving behind a free Iraq as Bush indicated, Rathmell 
concluded that,  
In reality, the CPA ended up creating nation-building institutions on the run, governing 
Iraq at all levels, supporting a counterinsurgency campaign, reconstructing and reforming 
Iraqi state institutions, and implementing democratic and economic transformation 
(Ehrenberg et al. 2010:184).  
 
CPA Order Number 1 (2003a), established on May 16, 2003 called for the de-Ba'athification of 
Iraq in which the Ba'ath party, the political party associated with the Hussein regime, was 
disestablished and barred from holding prominent ranks within the Iraqi military, and from 
holding positions in the top three layers of management in the national government ministry and 
related institutions. This Order thereby implemented the declaration by “eliminating the party's 
structures and removing its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi 
society" (Coalition 2003a:184). The order also outlawed any displays or symbols that resembled 
the likeness of Saddam Hussein or that of the Ba’ath Party on any government buildings or 
public spaces (Coalition 2003a). CPA Order Number 2 (2003b) was issued one week later and 
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intended to be complete the de-Ba’athification of Iraq. Order Number 2 (2003b) resolved jobs, 
titles, and entire agencies associated with the Ba'ath party. It also left the door open in regards to 
dissolved entities in that it cited that "additional organizations may be added to this list in the 
future" (Coalition 2003b:188). In September of 2003, Paul Bremer (2003), the Administrator of 
the CPA, drafted a seven-point plan for ending formal responsibility in Iraq which would consist 
of three phases. First, the Iraqis would write a constitution. Second, national elections would be 
held. Third, the CPA would be dissolved and sovereignty would be restored to Iraq (Ehrenberg et 
al. 2010). On March 8, 2004 the CPA issued a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) in order 
to govern the restoration of sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004. Within which it states that, 
The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic and pluralistic, 
and powers shall be shared between the federal government and the regional 
governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administration (Law 2004:204).  
 
Two years after the invasion of Iraq, U.S. administrators and politicians gave optimistic 
assessments of state-building, despite the fact that the Bush administration's plans for rebuilding 
received widespread criticism. On October 19, 2005 Condoleeza Rice presented a view of the 
progress in Iraq both domestically and internationally to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. In regards to the Hussein regime, Rice (2005:297) noted that, 
In 2003, enforcing UN resolutions, we overthrew a brutal dictator and liberated a nation. 
Our strategy then emphasized the military defeat of the regime's forces and the creation 
of a temporary government with the Coalition Provisional Authority and an Iraqi 
Governing Conflict.  
 
Further, in regards to the governmental transition, Rice (2005:298) stated that in 2005 the 
emphasis then shifted from regime change, to an emphasis on transition, specifically a "political 
transition to a permanent, constitutional democracy." However, Ehrenberg et al. (2010:297) 
noted that while the United States wanted to remodel Iraq using neoliberal economic ideologies, 
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the reconstruction project was not popular among the citizens of Iraq, "contributing to social 
discontent and helping fuel the developing insurgency."  
 
Geopolitical Interests 
 Throughout the literature regarding U.S. involvement in Iraq, there is significant evidence 
of the role of geopolitical interests on decision making. In the years before Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Dick Cheney delivered a speech at the London Institute of Petroleum at which he laid 
the groundwork for the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the United States and its allies. 
Cheney (1999:368) asserted that  
The Middle East and Africa have over one hundred years' supply of gas reserves as 
current low usage levels and the former Soviet Union and Latin America have gas 
reserves to production ratios which should last over seventy years.  
 
There was an expectation that significant amounts of the world's oil resources would come from 
areas such as the former Soviet Union and from China, however these expectations were quickly 
dashed. As a result, many countries, including the United States, turned to the Middle East for oil 
supplies making the area a key political and economic interest. In his article in the Wall Street 
Journal, Brent Scowcroft (2002:70) keyed in on these concerns by asserting that Saddam's key 
objectives seemed to be to control the Persian Gulf its oil reserves noting that this "clearly poses 
a real threat to key U.S. interests." These fears were further exemplified in Dick Cheney's speech 
given at the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention on August 26, 2002. Cheney 
(2002:78) emphasized that Hussein is in control of 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, and that 
he could "take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies and directly threaten 
America's friends throughout the region." This therefore asserts that Hussein was seen as posing 
a threat to the United States because he had the ability to seize control of the vital oil reserves 
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that it is dependent upon. In "The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq," Cohen 
(2003:382) discussed the potential benefits of Iraq leaving the OPEC regime, one of which being 
the fact that,  
An unencumbered flow of Iraqi oil would be likely to provide a more constant supply of 
oil to the global market, which would dampen price fluctuations, ensuring stable oil 
prices in the world market in a price range lower than the current $25 to $30 a barrel. 
 
This would greatly benefit the United States given the fact that oil prices would stay fairly stable 
at a low cost. Adding to the argument, the United States had a significant amount of influence 
and control over the decision on how Iraq was going to utilize its oil supply. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell has indicated that the oil of Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people and should not be 
exploited for the United States' own interests. However, Cohen (2003:381) argued that this 
statement does not "preclude the U.S. from offering its guidance to the future of government of 
Iraq on establishing sound economic and trade policies to stimulate growth and recovery." This 
would, of course, mean making a pact with the United States, thus solidifying its claim to the 
Iraqi oil reserves. By doing so, Ehrenberg et al. (2010:397) explained that Washington used "soft 
power as well as hard, coercive, power to shape policy in its own interest in Iraq." The United 
States also made sure to protect its own personnel and contractors situated in Iraq granting them 
immunity from Iraqi laws and regulations. CPA Order Number 17 (2004) enacted on June 27, 
2004 granted the CPA, their personnel, property, and funds, as well as other important U.S. and 
allied figures immunity from the Iraqi legal process. Contractors and sending states were also 
given this coveted immunity and were granted "freedom of movement without delay through 
Iraq" (Coalition 2004:211).  
66 
 
 In February of 2005 the National Energy Technology Laboratory's Executive Summary 
warned against the peaking of world oil production. In this summary, the National Energy 
Technology Laboratory (2005:369) concluded that, 
The peaking of world oil production presents the U.S. and the world with an 
unprecedented risk management problem. As peaking is approached, liquid fuel prices 
and price volatility will increase dramatically, and, without timely mitigation, the 
economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented.  
 
This further fueled the United States' need to influence Iraq to leave the OPEC regime and 
formulate a deal with them. As previously mentioned this would relatively stabilize the cost of 
oil as well as provide a more constant supply to the world market, in particular, the United 
States. These fears were brought to the surface in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report in which 
concerns over the health of the Iraqi economy after U.S. intervention and the politics of its oil 
reserves were discussed. In regards to Iraq's economic situation after U.S. intervention it was 
found that, 
Many leading economic indicators are negative. Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, 
growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent. 
Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The investment climate is 
bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see 
tangible improvements in their daily economic situation (Iraq 2006:373). 
 
These percentages failed to reach the benchmark previously set by the International Monetary 
Fund, in conjunction with the United States and Great Brittan, for economic growth and 
development in Iraq post invasion. Further, the Iraq Study Report (2006:374) asserted that the 
politics involved with the Iraqi oil reserves damaged any possibility of the creation of a unified 
central government, arguing that "the Iraqi constitution leaves the door open for regions to take 
the lead in developing new oil resources." Given the fact that the Iraqi constitution, created in 
2005, was formed under the supervision and guidance of the CPA, which has major ties to the 
United States, it becomes apparent that the oil interests of the United States was a primary 
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concern. This "partnership" between the United States and Iraq was further solidified in a press 
release that was accompanied by a speech given by President Bush on March 27, 2008 in which 
he assessed the progress being made in Iraq. In this assessment, President Bush stated that,  
Last year, Iraqi leaders requested to form a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S. 
This partnership would help assure Iraqis the political and economic and security 
cooperation between the nations will endure. This partnership would also ensure 
protections for American troops when the U.N. mandate for Multi-National Forces in Iraq 
expires in December (Fact 2008:395). 
 
Taken as a whole, this statement embodies the entirety of the aforementioned U.S. interests in 
Iraq. This strategic partnership, which was influenced by the CPA and consequently the United 
States, ensured that the United States would have a continued stake in Iraqi political matters as 
well as economic avenues such as oil and other resources. It also ensured protection for U.S. 
troops and personnel when other avenues expired. On November 17, 2008 the Status of Forces 
Agreement was signed by Iraqi and U.S. officials. This document was created to replace the U.N. 
mandate which authorized the presence of foreign forces which was set to expire at the end of 
2008. The agreement held U.S. troops and contractors accountable under Iraqi criminal law, 
however, Ehrenberg et al. (2010:336) noted that "contractors for the State Department and other 
agencies would retain immunity from Iraqi law, a provision that caused much controversy." Also 
notable, this agreement exempted members of U.S. forces and their civilian counterparts from 
taxation and fees and they were afforded the ability to import and export goods freely without the 
need for inspections or restrictions. Specifically, it stated that "the exportation of Iraqi goods by 
the United States Forces and United States contractors shall not be subject to inspections or any 
restrictions other than licensing requirements" (Status 2008:344). On the same day, the Strategic 
Framework Agreement was signed. This agreement solidified the future alliance of the United 
States and Iraq, emphasizing the shaping of cultural, economic, and energy cooperation between 
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the U.S. and Iraq (Ehrenberg et al. 2010). Section V of the Strategic Framework Agreement for a 
Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Iraq (2008:353) states that the parties agree to, 
Promote expansion of bilateral trade through the U.S.-Iraq Business Dialogue, as well as 
bilateral exchanges, such as trade promotion activities and access to Export-Import Bank 
programs…Support Iraq's further integration into regional and international financial 
economic communities and institutions, including membership in the World Trade 
Organization and through continued Normal Trade Relations with the United 
States…Encourage increased Iraqi agricultural exports, including through policy 
engagement and encouraging education of Iraqi exporters on U.S. health and safety 
regulations. 
 
By examining this particular document, it is evident that the United States aimed to make Iraq a 
World Trade Organization friendly country. It is also provides significant evidence that the 
United States had the intention of receiving continued imports from Iraq that were to be tailored 
specifically to meet U.S. standards.  Overall, Ehrenberg et al. (2010) notes that oil infiltrated 
every aspect of U.S. policy and actions in Iraq, specifically due to the role that it played in the 
U.S. economy. As the world's second largest reserve of oil, Iraq was vital to the interest of the 
United States.  
 
 Privatization  
 Soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the United States began a push to privatize broad 
aspects of the Iraqi economy, further bolstering the geopolitical and neo-liberal interests of the 
United States, particularly in regards to the lucrative Iraqi oil industry. This plan was evident in 
the Future of Iraq Project released in 2001 in which an economic empowerment system was 
devised. This system was to be sponsored by private parties that were designed to, 
Enter markets that in times past had been inaccessible to them, adopt technologies most 
suited to their needs, generate continuing streams of private and social capital, boost their 
financial returns with reasonable safety, and enjoy a sense of belonging buy-ins and 
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ownership of significant private enterprises bestow on them and their families (United 
States State Department 2001:365). 
 
Further, the Future of Iraq project listed the privatization of state run enterprises as one of the 
major goals and economic plans in order to support a new free-market economy. In "The Road to 
Economic Prosperity for a post-Saddam Iraq," Cohen (2003) bolstered the push for privatization 
by outlining the benefits of the privatization of the Iraqi oil industry. In order to maximize Iraq's 
economic performance, Cohen (2003:381) argued that "without private ownership, oil will 
remain politicized and mismanaged." The Bush administration agreed with this notion and 
through its executive directors, situated within both governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, based their policies on the "best practices developed around the world in the late 
1990's, when the largest government privatizations in history occurred" (2003:381). Cohen 
(2003) further recognized the benefit of these privatization policies by pointing out that the 
privatization of the Iraqi oil industry provides an incentive for Iraq to leave the OPEC cartel, thus 
benefiting the United States and the global oil supply in the long run. After the publication of 
Cohen's findings in the Heritage Foundation Report, a 101 page classified document created by 
the U.S. Treasury Department as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) detailing the privatization plans for Iraq was leaked to the Wall Street Journal and was 
later dubbed as the Bush administration's blue print for a neo-liberal post-Saddam Hussein state 
(Ehrenberg et al. 2010). One of the primary goals laid out in the aforementioned document was 
the privatization of Iraq's industries in which it was outlined that, 
The United States will attempt to build a consensus for industry privatization during the 
first year, after which the assets of the Iraqi public sector would be transferred to private 
ownership over a period of three years...The main controversy here is obviously the 




Interestingly, it is noted that the concept of privatization is not foreign to the Iraqi people due to 
the limited attempt at privatization in the 1980's. The creators also called for the modernization 
of the Baghdad stock exchange in order to accommodate the trading of shares of newly 
privatized companies. Lastly, the creators called for the creation of a legal framework that would 
be compatible with private ownership, production, and distribution, stating the need for "a 
system of laws protecting private property contracts and all of the supporting infrastructure that 
is required by a modern market economy" (United States Treasury Department 2003:297). In the 
following month, Washington's plans for the privatization of Iraq's economy were highlighted in 
a conglomerate of CPA orders, which were subsequently met by fierce opposition from the Iraqi 
political sector. CPA Order Number 12 (2003c) was "designed to set the conditions for 
privatization by opening Iraq to international economic forces" (Ehrenberg et al. 2010:198). This 
order included both the trade liberalization policy and the suspension of tariffs and trade 
restrictions. In December of the same year, CPA Order Number 39 (2003d) supplemented Order 
Number 12 (2003c) and emphasized a "dynamic private sector and the need to enact institutional 
and legal reforms to give it effect" (Coalition 2003d:199). In 2005, USAID created and 
implemented the Private Sector Development Program in Iraq which dismissed the state-owned 
economy that existed under Saddam Hussein and emphasized privatization as the preferred tool 
for the reconstruction of Iraq. In regards to privatization, the contract states that, 
The majority of economic activity in Iraq is funneled through over 500 state-owned 
enterprises, creating an unsupportable system. Through technical assistance and support, 
USAID is helping the Government of Iraq (GOI) privatize much of the economy, 
removing a major burden from the national budget and revitalizing the private sector. In 
2005, USAID helped draft the privatization Committee to reduce redundancy, increase 
efficiency, and ensure a transparent privatization process (United States Agency for 




Following the completion and implementation of the Private Sector Development Program in 
Iraq, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a stand-by arrangement for Iraq in which 
it created a legal basis for the privatized Iraqi oil industry (IMF 2005). In the aftermath of the 
widespread privatization of the Iraq economy and oil industry, U.S. Steelworkers supported the 
Iraqi oil workers in their attempt to thwart privatization of their national oil industry. Leo W. 
Gerard (2007:392), the International President, wrote to Congress opposing the privatization of 
the Iraqi oil industry in which he expressed the union's belief that "the oil privatization law...is 
designed to benefit the multinational oil companies; not the Iraqi people.” Overall, the 
privatization plans for Iraq, particularly those concerning the oil industry, enacted by the United 
States provoked economic uncertainty within the Iraqi population causing them to turn on one 
another and subsequently increase their resistance to American occupation and reconstruction of 
Iraq. Ehrenberg et al. (2010) noted that the privatization of the Iraqi economy drove a wedge 
between Iraq's ethnics groups and caused the country's other economic assets to be sold at near 
nothing prices. This, in turn, fed the distain for the U.S. occupation and restructuring of Iraq and 
became a cornerstone issue for the rising insurgency.  
 
Free-Markey Economy 
 Further evidence of the United States’ use of realpolitik in Iraq is evidenced by the 
uncontested push for the creation of a free-market economy. Working in conjunction with 
privatization and deregulation, the creation of a free-market economy in Iraq opened the 
country's economy up to western markets and vastly benefited the primary stakeholder, the 
United States. Indicated in the preceding documentation, this push was spearheaded primarily by 
the CPA and, subsequently, the United States. Released in 2001, the Future of Iraq Project 
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provided a compilation of principle economic challenges planners would have in reconstructing 
the new Iraq and "supporting new free market economic system" (United States State 
Department 2001:365). This, of course, insinuates that the plan for the reconstruction of the Iraqi 
economy revolved around creating and accommodating a free market economic system. The 
aforementioned CPA Order Number 12 (2003c) also provided evidence for the United States’ 
plan to restructure the Iraqi economy into a free market system. Specifically, the introduction of 
the Order states that "recognizing the central role of international trade in Iraq's recovery and its 
development of a free market economy, acting on behalf, and for the benefit of, the Iraqi people, 
I hereby promulgate the following" (Coalition 2003c:198). The remainder of the Order laid the 
blueprints for the privatization of the Iraqi economy which works in conjunction with a free 
market economic system. However, it is significant to note that the goal emphasized by Bremer 
in CPA Order Number 12 (2003c) was to facilitate the development of a free market economy in 
Iraq. In December of the same year, CPA Order Number 39 (2003d) supplemented Order 
Number 12 (2003c) and further outlined the importance of developing and ensuring a free market 
system in Iraq. This Order was to act in a matter consistent with the Report of the Secretary 
General to the Security Council on July 17, 2003, "concerning the need for the development of 
Iraq and its transition from a non-transparent centrally planned economy to a market economy 
characterized by sustainable economic growth" (Coalition 2003d:199). The Order ensured this 
transformation by emphasizing the private sector and encouraging and implementing foreign 
investment in Iraq. The USAID Private Sector Development Program in Iraq also emphasized 
the transition to a free market economy stating, 
USAID assisted the GOI in submitting the Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime, the 
first step in joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). The accession process will 
oblige Iraq to reform its trade regulations and establish an open, market based economy 
(United States Agency for International Development 2005:400).  
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Following the completion and implementation of the Private Sector Development Program in 
Iraq, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a stand-by arrangement (IMF 2005) 
which was created to provide Iraq with the assistance it needed to transform its economy to a 
free-market based system. The Executive Board outlined the goals and functions of the program, 
stating that,  
The program, which envisages an increase in economic growth, a reduction in inflation, 
and an increase in net international reserves, maintains a focus on macroeconomic 
stability, while improving governance and advancing Iraq's transition to a market 
economy (IMF 2005:399).  
 
The program also established a debt restructuring agreement to support economic programs 
through 2005, given that this restructuring exemplified neo-liberal, free-market ideals. Overall, 
Bremer's mission, and subsequently the mission of the CPA, was to "implant a free-market 
economy in Iraq," following the Future or Iraq Project's declaration that "the economic system 
most appropriate for Iraq the day after the current regime is a profit-based system" (Ehrenberg et 
al. 2010:359). This goal of a profit-based free-market economy was envisioned through 
widespread privatization.  
 
Deregulation 
 In order to fully achieve the United States' goal of a privatized free-market based Iraq, 
thus opening the country's economy up to foreign trade and investment at promoting the spread 
of U.S. geopolitical and neo-liberal economic values, widespread deregulation became 
commonplace in joint U.S. Iraqi legislation. Yet again, the CPA led the way. The Future of Iraq 
Project evaluated and addressed the restrictions placed upon the Iraqi economy by the Hussein 
regime. It was notated that "Saddam's totalitarian regime has not allowed any large-scale 
economic endeavors in the private sector," and that the businesses that did exist were berated and 
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exploited by government officials (United States State Department 2001:365). Further, several 
challenges standing in the way of transforming the Iraqi economy into a free-market system were 
outlined. Specifically, these challenges included "dismantling the current illegal structures and 
enterprises, removing ruling party cliques from ownership/control and privatizing some state run 
enterprises” (2001:365). In addition, the challenge for the new Iraq was laid out as being the 
ability to "foster economic and regulatory conditions that allow new, voluntary, individual 
businesses and entrepreneurial activities under free, legal, competitive market conditioning" 
(2001:365). To foster privatization and a free-market economic system as the Future of Iraq 
Project called for, deregulation of the market was deemed as being necessary. In "The Road to 
Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq," Cohen (2003:381) asserted that "privatization 
needs to be accompanied by reforms to open markets, removal of price and exchange rate 
distortions, reductions in barriers to entry, and elimination of monopoly powers." Soon after 
Cohen's (2003) publication in The Heritage Report, Bremer enacted CPA Order Number 12 
(2003c), outlining the need for deregulation in the form of suspensions of tariffs and trade 
restrictions. Section 1 of CPA Order Number 12 (2003c:198) declared that, 
All tariffs, customs duties, import taxes, licensing fees and similar surcharges for goods 
entering or leaving Iraq, and all other trade restrictions that may apply to such goods, are 
suspended until December 31, 2003. For the remainder of this year, the CPA will not 
collect such fees for goods entering Iraq by land, sea, or air.  
 
By suspending the aforementioned regulations implemented by the Hussein regime, CPA Order 
Number 12 (2003c) opened Iraq up to foreign investment and promotion. CPA Order Number 39 
(2003d) also promoted foreign investment by deregulation of previously restrictive laws created 
by the Hussein regime. Specifically, the Order (2003d:199) declared that, 
Recognizing the problems arising from Iraq's legal framework regulating commercial 
activity and the way in which it was implemented by the former regime...This Order 
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specifies the terms and procedures for making foreign investments and is intended to 
attract new foreign investment in Iraq.  
 
Two years later, the USAID Private Sector Development Program in Iraq which "dismissed the 
state-owned economy that had existed under Saddam Hussein, criticized its mismanagement, and 
declared the need to remove its barriers to private sector-led growth," was singed into effect 
(Ehrenberg et al. 2010:400). This contract claimed to facilitate investment promotion by 
"promoting foreign investment and removing the barriers to private-sector growth" (United 
States Agency for International Development 2005:400). Subsequently, the removal of the 
barriers implemented by the Hussein regime were argued to promote a free-market economy that 
would generate employment and foreign investment in Iraq. 
 
SYRIA: THE REPEAT OF REALPOLITIK AND PRIORITIZATION OF GEOPOLITICAL 
INTERESTS 
Regime Change  
 As in Iraq, there is a significant amount of dialog regarding regime change in Syria, 
specifically targeting Bashar al-Assad. Byman and Miles (2012) examined the problems that 
could occur if and when, the al-Assad regime falls and America's role in this dilemma. While 
neither of the authors speaks directly for the United States, they each have a unique 
understanding of the situation in Syria and have connections with the United States Department 
of Defense. Utilizing this knowledge, in the event of the fall of the Assad regime, Byman and 
Miles (2012:48) predict that "the long and bloody Syrian conflict is likely to generate a failed 
state requiring the kind of large-scale reconstruction efforts seen in Iraq and Afghanistan." The 
regime kept rival ethnic communities throughout Syria pacified through the use of force; 
however this also created deeply rooted schisms making any new government's chances of 
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legitimacy relatively weak. In regards to U.S. intervention in Syria, Byman and Miles (2012:48) 
assert that "the United States and its allies are unlikely to overcome Syria's myriad of problems 
and establish a peaceful stable and democratic Syria.” The authors warn that the removal of the 
Assad regime would create dangerous power vacuums that could result in the rise of jihadists. 
Specifically, Byman and Miles (2012:49) assert that, 
These fighters want an Islamic state in the parts of Syria they control, and they will try to 
sway or coerce Syrians into joining their group...Syria may go from importing terrorists 
to exporting them, with Al Qaeda and other groups using territory they control to launch 
attacks on neighboring states and perhaps even Western targets outside the region. 
 
If the United States were to implement a democratic system as well as a court system to try those 
responsible for atrocities as they did in Iraq, Byman and Miles (2012:52) predict that 
"conducting a mass purging of government officials such as in Iraq can be similarly 
destabilizing." Despite these predictions, on May 12, 2012 a publication in The New York Times 
highlighted Obama's plans for Syria and subsequently its President, Bashar al-Assad. In order to 
stop the violence in Syria, Cooper and Landler (2012) reported that President Obama will push 
for the removal of al-Assad modeled after the transition that occurred in Yemen. Specifically, 
Cooper and Landler (2012:1) report that the plan calls for, 
A negotiated political settlement that would satisfy Syrian opposition groups but that 
could leave remnants of Mr. Assad’s government in place. Its goal is the kind of 
transition under way in Yemen, where after months of violent unrest, President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh agreed to step down and hand control to his vice president, Abdu Rabbu 
Mansour Hadi, in a deal arranged by Yemen’s Arab neighbors. Mr. Hadi, though later 
elected in an uncontested vote, is viewed as a transitional leader. 
 
However, any attempt by the United States or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to 
take action against the regime has been blocked by Vladimir Putin and Russia. In order for 
Obama to achieve his goal of the removal of the Assad regime using the Yemen model, an 
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agreement must be promulgated between the two opposing countries. Cooper and Landler 
(2012:1) assert that, 
For Washington, the most important aspect of the Yemen model is its assumption, from 
the outset, that the leader — in this case, Bashar Assad — will exit. For Moscow, its most 
important feature is the endorsement of a very gradual process that preserves the basic 
structures of the regime and in which the leader is not unceremoniously kicked out. 
 
Moreover, as Allison (2013) points out, no such deal has transpired between Russia and the 
United States in regards to the removal of the Assad regime. Further Allison (2013) asserts that, 
Even if it had, it would most likely have been rejected by the Syrian rebel groups. Since 
then western officials have vainly tried to enlist Moscow's help in pressing for the 
replacement of Assad as a preconditioning to forming a new transitional government in 
Syria. 
 
Given the status of the sectarian schism within Syria created primarily by Assad's harsh policies, 
the Islamic opposition groups situated within Syria are given sustenance by the United States' 
policy towards the Assad regime. Further, Tabler (2013) examined the potential cost of inaction 
by the United States in Syria. In the years preceding 2013, Washington has sought diplomatic 
isolation of Syria by implementing financial sanctions upon the regime, imposing a raft of oil 
trade, attempting to assist in organizing divided opposition groups into the National Coalition for 
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, as well as offering upwards of $700 million dollars 
in humanitarian aid to Syrian civilians. However, Tabler (2013:3) notated that, 
Fearing that American weapons could find their way into the hands of extremists, the 
United States has more or less ignored the armed opposition, which effectively replaced 
the civilian activists at the vanguard of the effort to topple Assad more than a year and a 
half ago and already controls large swaths of territory in the country. Washington's 
hesitation has led many armed groups to seek support elsewhere -- including from private 
Salafi and jihadist funders in Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. 
 
In order to prevent a repeat of Iraq, the United States avoided a full scale armament and land 
invasion of Syria, however this inaction, as Tabler (2013) points out, comes at a steep price. In 
an attempt to thwart the further rise of anti-American sentiment, Talbler (2013:6) suggests a 
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ground-up strategy to win back the trust of the Syrian people, specifically by "backing the more 
liberal, secular, and nationalist battalions and isolating -- and possibly launching drone strikes 
against -- these extremist forces that refuse to adopt civilian authority during the transition."  
 Despite the fear of a repeat of Iraq or the backlash from Vladimir Putin and Russia, 
President Obama spoke against the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons is his address to the 
nation on September 10, 2013. In this address President Obama (2013:3) asserted that, 
I will not put American boots on the ground in Syria. I will not pursue an open-ended 
action like Iraq or Afghanistan...This would be a targeted strike to achieve a clear 
objective: deterring the use of chemical weapons, and degrading Assad's capabilities...I 
don't think we should remove another dictator with force -- we learned from Iraq that 
doing so makes us responsible for all that comes next. 
 
While the President did not elect to forcibly remove Assad from power, it was made clear that a 
diplomatic solution to the Assad problem was being formulated, stating that Secretary of State 
John Kerry was being sent to Russia to negotiate with Assad's biggest ally. Following this 
address, Kinninmont (2014:50) reported that from September of 2013 onward, the United States 
focused on diplomatic solutions and humanitarian responses while at the same time "continuing 
to provide aid to the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA)." 
Specifically, by providing the FSA with limited amounts of weapons, despite the fear of these 
weapons potentially landing in the hands of jihadist opposition groups. On September 23, 2014 
President Obama addressed the nation concerning U.S. airstrikes in Syria targeting the Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Within which, President Obama (2014:2) asserted that the 
United States will "move forward with our plans, supported by bipartisan majorities in Congress, 
to ramp up our effort to train and equip the Syrian opposition, who are the best counterweight to 
ISIL and the Assad regime." As in earlier measures, the United States took no physical boots on 
the ground measures to remove Bashar al-Assad. However, in an attempt to passively remove 
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Assad from power, the United States decided to provide more equipment and training to the 
Syrian opposition.  
 This strategy is evidenced in the National Security Strategy, released in February 2015. 
Within which, the plans for regime change in Syria are outlined, stating that, 
We are working with our partners to train and equip a moderate Syrian opposition to 
provide a counterweight to the terrorists and the brutality of the Assad regime. Yet, the 
only lasting solution to Syria's civil war remains political -- an inclusive political 
transition that responds to the legitimate aspirations of all Syrian citizens (Obama 
2015:10). 
 
In his speech given in November of 2015, Secretary of Defense John Kerry discussed the U.S. 
strategy in Syria in which he declared that neither Daesh nor the civil war could be stopped with 
al-Assad in power. Further, Secretary Kerry (2015:3) emphasized the role that the Assad regime 
played in the underlying sectarian violence within Syria, stating that "the four decades of 
dictatorial rule choked off any attempt to develop an organized political opposition." He also 
asserted that the U.S. is pushing for a full political transition in Syria in stating that, 
I got news for you, it will not stop. Because there are those invested in what has 
happened and in what has been done to them, who see Assad as the critical component of 
the transition. That's why we are pushing so are for a real transition. Because without a 
real transition, no matter how much we want it, the fighting will continue and the war 
will never end (Kerry 2015:5). 
 
In the days following Secretary Kerry's (2015) press conference, The Wall Street Journal 
published an article entitled "Obama Says Syrian Leader Bashar al-Assad Must Go." Within 
which, Nelson (2015) reported on President Obama's statement in which he noted that regardless 
of the actions of others, al-Assad cannot regain political legitimacy and while the dictator 
remains in power, there will be no end to the civil war in Syria. On the contrary, in December of 
2015, ABC News published an article entitled "U.S. Not Seeking Regime Change in Syria, Kerry 
Says." Reevell (2015:1) reported that following Secretary Kerry's meeting with Vladimir Putin in 
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Moscow, the Secretary stated that "the United States and its partner are not seeking so-called 
regime change as it is know in Syria." Rather, the possibility of Assad remaining in power during 
the transitional period was discussed. However, Reevell (2015) continued to report that Secretary 
Kerry does not believe that Assad has the ability to remain as Syria's leader in the future.  
In regards to regime change in Syria, it has been made clear that the United States does 
not support the Assad regime and is pushing for the dictator to step aside. To date, hard power 
has not been authorized to physically remove Assad however; specific measures are being taken 
in order to ensure that Assad cannot remain in power in the foreseeable future. However, regime 
change in Syria has the distinct possibility of creating a power vacuum within the state, as it did 
in Iraq, which could lead to the rise of radical jihadist groups, particularly ISIS. The Assad 
regime has facilitated deep rooted ethnic schisms between the ruling Alawite Shiites and the 
marginalized Sunnis causing many Sunnis to turn their allegiance to radical jihadist sects. If the 
ruling Alwaites were to be removed, a power vacuum could ensue, resulting in the possibility of 
the rise to power of Sunni backed radicalized groups such as ISIS. 
 
Geopolitical Interests  
 While the evidence outlining the United States' desire for regime change in Syria is 
undeniable, there is also a speckling of significant information regarding its geopolitical interests 
in the state. Byman and Miles (2012) make significant points and predictions about U.S. interest 
in Syria. While President Obama and Secretary Kerry made it clear that putting boots on the 
ground was not on the agenda, Byman and Miles (2012:48) point out that being present in some 
way would be beneficial to the United States in that it would "offer the United States more 
legitimacy in supporting regional democracy, greater legitimacy to weigh in on key regional 
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issues and a better strategic position to counter potential threats to U.S. interests." Similar to Iraq, 
Syria presents the United States with an opportunity to set conditions for economic recovery 
including the rollback of sanctions and the accommodation of foreign investment (2012). 
Further, being absent in the Syrian crisis portrays America as somewhat of a faltering or 
weakening superpower, further compounded by shortcomings in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also 
important, Syria poses a direct threat to key U.S. allies throughout the Middle East. Due to its 
Alawite leadership, a Shiite sect, Syria acts as one of the last remaining major allies of Iran, who 
President Bush (2002b) classified as one of the “axis of evil” states along with Iraq and North 
Korea. Because Syria is under the control of the Alawites, it acts as a threat to Sunni states, 
including Saudi Arabia, one of the United States’ major allies in the region. Further, The United 
States’ alliance with Israel is a major factor in its insistence for leadership change in Syria as it 
poses a direct threat to Israel’s security. Syria provides the Palestinian liberation group, Hamas, 
with an external base. Under Assad, it also supports an Iranian transit route for financial and 
military assistance to Hamas and Hezbollah for the purpose of countering Israeli dominance in 
the Arab region (Simura 2015). Syrian's chemical weapon arsenal also poses a threat to Israel’s 
security. Further, the partition of Syria also threatens the neighboring state of Iraq, which the 
United States has poured immeasurable amounts of time and money into and now considers 
being an ally. Allison (2013:822) illuminates this concern noting that warnings have surfaced "at 
senior levels in the United States and from Assad himself about the risks of a partition of Syria, 
which would have grave ramifications for and beyond the neighboring states of Lebanon, Iraq, 
and Jordan." 
Directly following Allison's (2013) publication, Tabler (2013:2) further detailed the 
threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East and asserted that "avoiding the problem looks less and 
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less feasible, as the situation in Syria shifts from a mostly contained humanitarian catastrophe to 
a strategic disaster for the United States and its regional allies.” On September 10, 2013 in his 
address to the nation on the situation in Syria, President Obama (2013:4) addressed the Syrian 
threat against Israel and concluded that "our ally, Israel, can defend itself with overwhelming 
force, as well as the unshakeable support of the United States of America." The following month, 
Saudi Arabia turned down the opportunity to serve in a non-permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council. After which, the Head of Intelligence, Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin 
Abdel-Aziz Al Saud, stated that the rejection "had been a message for the U.S., not the U.N., and 
that Saudi Arabia would be moving away from the U.S. and towards other allies" (Kinninmont 
2014:50). This stemming directly from pro-Western Arab states’ frustration with the United 
States due to its lack of action in Syria. This too poses a threat to U.S. dominance in the Middle 
East as it has allowed Russia to gain political ground, and thus legitimacy as a world superpower 
in the international arena.  
 On September 23, 2014 President Obama addressed the nation regarding airstrikes in 
Syria conducted by the Unites States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, 
and Qatar, targeting ISIL in Syria. Within which President Obama (2014:2) stated that "it must 
be clear to anyone who would plot against America and try to do American's harm that we will 
not tolerate safe havens for terrorists who threaten our people." Thus, proclaiming Syria as a 
threat to the United States and subsequently, its interests. In the National Defense Strategy 
released in February 2015, President Obama (2015:7) addressed these concerns and stated that, 
We embrace our responsibilities for underwriting international security because it serves 
our interests, upholds our commitments to allies and partners, and addresses threats that 
are truly global...And our allies and partners in other regions, including our security 




Further, President Obama (2015:26) asserted that the United States will "ensure the free flow of 
energy from the region to the world." Undoubtedly referring to Syria's oil supply given that the 
region is home to 65 percent of the world's proven oil reserves.  
 As a whole, the interest in Syria by the United States is compounded by a multitude of 
motivational factors and geopolitical interests. Action in Syria gives the United States the 
opportunity to set the conditions for economic recovery. By doing so, Syria could, like Iraq, 
become a World Trade Organization friendly country, which has the possibility to benefit the 
United States and its allies greatly. Syria also provides the United States with an opportunity to 
reaffirm its position as the global superpower after failures in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Syria 
poses a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, primarily that of its allies. As an Alawite led 
country, Syria acts as the last major ally of Iran, who acts as a threat to Sunni states such as 
Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. ally in the region. Further, through its support of Palestinian liberation 
groups, and its arsenal of chemical weapons, Syria poses a unique security threat to longtime 
U.S. ally, Israel. The possibility of the partitioning of Syria becomes hazardous to neighboring 
states, including Iraq, a country that the United States has deep ties to. Finally, Syria’s vast oil 
reserves play a vital role in its importance to the United States, as well as the global north.  
 
REALPOLITIK AND "TRUTH": MERGING THE CASES 
 The above analysis has thoroughly documented the presence and prioritization of the U.S. 
geopolitical interests and the exercise of realpolitik in Iraq and Syria. U.S. action in Iraq and 
Syria was motivated by neo-liberalism and realpolitik and the ideology has been entrenched in 
the system and has become the overarching truth. Any objection or critique of the development 
plan for Iraq was dismissed. Since the goal of neo-liberalism and realpolitik is capital 
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accumulation and these goals are learned and entrenched within the system, the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein, while illegal, was carried out in order to reach these goals creating a 
subsequent power vacuum opening up opportunities for those vying for power. Similarly, the 
restructuring of the Iraqi economy emulated these goals, leaving Iraq’s economy in a weakened 
state. These criminogenic behaviors promoted system criminality in that multiple levels of actors 
were involved, including states, organizations, and IFI’s. All of these actions reinforced the 
status quo at the benefit of the United States.  
 Other factors played a significant role in how these occupations and interventions were 
able to be carried out contrary to international law. As such, the integrated theory of violations of 
international criminal law provides an overarching explanation of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and 
Syria and the subsequent creation of power vacuums. In regards to Foucault’s notion of Regimes 
of Truth, by separating U.S. policy in Iraq and Syria into specific instances of regime change, 
geopolitical interests, privatization, free-market economic changes, and deregulation it becomes 
evident that the promotion of democracy in Iraq and Syria using neo-liberal ideologies, such as 
those listed above, and realpolitik are the ascribed “truths” utilized by the United States when 
formulating its foreign policy. These truths were created, and later perpetuated, by those who 
wielded power within the United States government, specifically by members of the Bush-
Cheney administration. In the aforementioned text, both President Bush and Vice President 
Cheney highlighted the need for a “liberated Iraq” or a “free Iraq” in speeches regarding the 
removal of the Hussein regime from power in exchange for a westernized democratic 
government (Cheney 2002:79; Bush 2003b:176). 
 Foucault (1977:74) asserts that these truths are “linked in a circular relation with systems 
of power which produce and sustain it.” With this being said, truth, in this case being the 
85 
 
promotion of democracy in the Middle East using neo-liberal ideologies and realpolitik, was 
created and reinforced by the Bush-Cheney administration who then proclaimed it to be absolute. 
This established truth then guided the way in which development in the Middle East was 
discussed. Because this truth was considered to be absolute, it then became the generalized way 
of thinking throughout the entirety of the administration. Therefore, the only viable option for the 
United States in regards to foreign policy in Middle East, specifically Iraq and Syria, would be to 
promote the spread of its own neo-liberal westernized democratic ideals. Chiefly because these 
truths were seen as the only method to the proposed solution, leaving no room for any alternative 
methods. This phenomenon is exemplified by Congress’ complete disregard to U.S. Steelworkers 
International President Leo. W. Gerard’s (2007) letter opposing the privatization of the Iraqi oil 
industry in which he expressed his concern that this privatization was to benefit the United States 
rather than the Iraqi people. Similarly, Ehrenburg et al. (2010:281) note that experts on the 
Middle East argued that the democratic lag in the region could be explained by,  
Dependence on oil, which resulted in a distributive rather than a productive economy; 
long-standing tensions between liberal and Islamic political thought; a gender gap in 
political and social affairs; and, most importantly, the fact that no region of the world had 
been so thoroughly ensnared in great power struggles as the Middle East. 
 
Despite these findings, the Bush administration argued that the region needed an external push 
towards democratization. The administration predicted that, “regime change in the Iraq would 
have a snowball effect prompting democratization throughout the whole region, and, indeed, all 
over the world” (2010:281). 
 Further, these truths became entrenched within the political stem and became the 
overarching regime of truth. The primary goal of neo-liberalism and realpolitik is capital 
accumulation, and as mentioned earlier, these goals are learned and entrenched within the 
system. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States, while illegal, was carried out in 
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order to reach these geopolitical goals which then created a power vacuum in Iraq. Subsequently, 
these actions opened up opportunities for those vying for power, namely ISIS. Similarly, the 
restructuring of the Iraqi economy emulated the geopolitical goals of the United States, leaving 
Iraq’s economy in a weakened state. The push by the United States to privatize and deregulate 
Iraq's economy in the name of ne-liberalism and realpolitik left many Iraqi citizens disillusioned 
and without work. As a result, its citizens much more susceptible to and sympathetic of the 
insurgency movements that resulted from the power vacuum. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Preemptive war in Iraq as well as forcible regime change by the United States incited 
widespread opposition from the Iraqi people towards the ensuing foreign occupation. United 
States action in Iraq including regime change, geopolitical interests, privatization, free-market 
economic reform, and deregulation sparked the rise of anti-occupation sectarian violence that 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld attributed to “criminals, dead-enders, foreign fighters, 
and lingering Ba'ath party leaders” (Ehrenberg et al. 2010: 213). However, U.S. reconstruction 
policies in Iraq proved to be detrimental to its citizens causing widespread anti-occupation 
sentiment. The forcible removal of Hussein from power created widespread chaos in which the 
United States and the Coalition Provisional Authority failed to provide adequate security to 
quell. The Iraqi National Security Strategy recognized this failure in stating that terrorist groups 
“have found an opportunity for expansion due to the lack of security after the collapse of the 
previous regime” (Republic of Iraq 2007:267). Further, the U.S. removal of Hussein and the 
subsequent de-Ba’athification of Iraq empowered the Shia and Kurds, but it created a significant 
power vacuum that left the Sunni population targeted by punitive policies and demoralized 
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which encouraged Sunni nationalists to turn their allegiance to Al Qaeda. The widespread 
privatization and deregulation of Iraq by the United States incited panic within the Iraqi 
population who subsequently turned on one another in competition for job opportunities which 
dwindled after the market was opened up to foreign investment, furthering anti-occupation 
resistance. Similarly in Syria, security is becoming a major cause for concern as armed gangs 
and powerful warlords regularly capture wealthy citizens in exchange for hefty ransoms. If the 
United States were to take similar action in Syria as it did in Iraq, the possibility of the rise of 
extremist groups is significant. The Assad regime has created deeply rooted schisms between the 
ruling Alwaite Shia and the Sunnis, causing many of the marginalized Sunni population to turn 
its allegiance to violent jihadist groups that are quickly becoming more powerful. If the United 
States were to remove the Assad regime and dismantle the Alawite ruling class as it did with the 
Hussein regime and the Ba'ath party in Iraq, it would  leave Syria with an immediate power 
vacuum that could easily be filled by the awaiting Sunni backed extremist groups, particularity 
ISIS. Further, if the United States were to implementing policies regarding free-market economic 
reform, privatization, and deregulation as it has in Iraq, it could lead to anti-occupation resistance 













 This study set out to explore how the U.S. foreign policy, driven by realpolitik and neo-
liberalism in Iraq and Syria, resulted in the rise of violent extremist groups such as ISIS. 
Previous research has focused on the commission of state crimes abroad, however there has been 
no criminological research examining the U.S. involvement in Syria of how their policies and 
interventions create power vacuums that allow for and facilitate the rise of terrorist groups vying 
for power.  
 
Empirical Findings  
 After analyzing the data collected, it was evident that the United States' prioritization of 
realpolitik and the exercise of geopolitical interests as priority in Iraq ultimately resulted in the 
creation of a power vacuum in which Al Qaeda gladly filled. The forcible removal of Saddam 
Hussein by the United States incited anarchical conditions that the United States and the 
Coalition Provisional Authority failed to quell. U.S. privatization and deregulation of the Iraqi 
economy left its citizens without jobs and acted as a catalyst for the ensuing sectarian schism 
between the ruling Shia and the disenfranchised Sunnis. Likewise, Assad's regime in Syria has 
created a deeply seeded schism between the ruling Alwite Shias and the remaining Sunnis. Given 
the similarity in make up between the two countries, by utilizing the aforementioned data 
regarding the United States' use of realpolitik and neo-liberalism in Iraq, it is reasonable to 
conclude that if the United States were to remove the Assad regime and dismantle the Alawite 
ruling class as it did with the Hussein regime and the Ba'ath party in Iraq, it would leave Syria 
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with an immediate power vacuum that could easily be filled by Sunni backed extremist groups, 
including ISIS.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
 The empirical findings of this study exemplify both Foucault's notion of regimes of truth, 
which is encompassed by the overarching integrated theory of violations of international criminal 
laws, and the realpolitik theoretical frame. The promotion of democracy in the Middle East using 
neo-liberal ideologies and realpolitik became the truth and was further ingrained in the 
overarching regime of truth, thus solidifying its role as the only viable option for the United 
States. Further, the realpolitik theoretical frame was epitomized by the United States' actions in 
Iraq and Syria of condemning oppressive regimes, namely the Hussein and Assad regimes, while 
at the same time pursing its own political and economic interests in the region. By utilizing both 
the integrated theory of violations of international criminal laws and the realpolitik theoretical 
frame, this study provides a more holistic explanation of the United States' involvement in Iraq 
and Syria and the subsequent rise of extremist groups such as ISIS.  
 
Policy Implications  
While limited, this study provides a better understanding of the consequences of the 
United States utilizing comparable policies and practices in Syria as it did in Iraq and 
Afghanistan by examining how these actions, driven by realpolitik and neo-liberalism, create 
power vacuums and allow for the rise of terrorist groups vying for power. While it is not likely 
that the results of this study will change the course of U.S. foreign policy regarding Syria, the 
aforementioned evidence indicates that by rethinking the foreign policy strategy utilized in Iraq 
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and Afghanistan and changing these policies and practices before interacting with Syria, the 
United States may be able to avoid the creation of dangerous power vacuums and, subsequently, 
the further development of extremists groups such as ISIS. 
 
Limitations and Future Research  
The results of this study are not without limitations. Most notably, the generalizability of 
these results is extremely limited. U.S. action in both Iraq and Syria are strikingly similar, for 
that reason the results are highly transferable. However, outside of this specific phenomenon 
occurring within the two countries, the results of this research are not generalizable to other 
situations. While the chronological temporal approach utilized by this study allowed for data 
collection from a multiplicity of sources and time periods, due to the time constraints of the 
particular study, the data collected was not all inclusive or exhaustive. The nature of the data 
being collected also presented its own set of limitations. Many of the documents being analyzed 
were governmental and politically driven documents in which Rothe and Collins (2011:27) note 
that this can result in selectively of information given and knowledge management. Similarly, 
much of the documentation regarding U.S. involvement in Iraq is still heavily either classified or 
heavily censored.  
 In order to expand on the results of this study, it would be beneficial for future 
researchers to conduct a longitudinal study regarding the United States’ interaction with Iraq as 
well as the development of extremists groups such as ISIS. This would allow for the data to be 
exhaustive and all inclusive. It would also be beneficial for future researchers to expand upon the 
rise of extremists groups once the power vacuums have been created. In order to increase the 
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generalizability of this research, future research should focus on similar instances occurring 
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